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ABSTRACT CLAUSES AND THE DESCRIPTIVE 
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SILVIO R. VINCETI* 
ABSTRACT 
There seems to be an intuitive distinction between the concrete and 
abstract clauses of the U.S. Constitution: If concrete clauses—such as 
Article II’s requirement that the U.S. President be at least thirty-five years 
of age—appear fairly uncontroversial as to their meaning and reference, 
abstract clauses—such as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel 
and unusual punishments”—show a more vague and debatable content.  
In the Article, I argue that the peculiar modality of legal change 
abstract clauses undergo thwarts a complete understanding of the U.S. 
Constitution in originalist terms. I take up Dworkin’s “moral reading” 
originalism and Bork’s “orthodox” one as two archetypal reconstructions 
of the Framers’ intent in regard to abstract clauses. Despite substantial 
differences, both a Borkean and Dworkinian originalism share a 
commitment to a formal understanding of abstract clauses. For different 
reasons, however, they both fail in providing a sound account of abstract 
clauses’ change over time. If Dworkin’s account seems at variance with 
the rationale of a rigid constitution, a Borkean conception of abstract 
clauses, although interpretatively sound, appears at odds with reality. 
From the failure of the two reconstructions, I deduce several 
conclusions. First, that the best way to make sense of the abstract clauses’ 
change is to give up any formalist account thereof: Abstract clauses give 
rise to a plain instance of informal legal change, the reason for that 
possibly being that formalism is in competition with other human values—
namely, the desirability of the outcomes. In that abstract clauses do not 
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comport with formalism, an originalist account thereof is not descriptively 
accurate. 
But if abstract clauses do not abide by formal legal reasoning, the 
lawyer might wonder how to deal with them—especially, when faced in 
court. I contend that philosophy of language could hardly be of any help, 
despite the fact that abstract clauses recall the vagaries in reference 
“indexicals” bring about in analytic philosophy. Conversely, the 
employment of disciplines that study human behavior in different 
normative domains might prove decisive. 
If these reflections wound up agreeable, the validity of the insights of 
American legal realism would be reaffirmed. On the one hand, 
constitutional law is, to some extent, “legally indeterminate”; on the 
other, empirical social sciences—not armchair philosophy—are our best 
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Every American citizen is at least vaguely aware of the momentous 
effects constitutional change can produce in the legal system. It may sound 
surprising that a formal analysis of constitutional change could leave the 
jurist in a theoretical predicament. More precisely, that by following the 
logical argumentation that underlies the legal change of a particular type 
of constitutional clause, the “loyal” originalist interpreter—whose 
exclusive concern is the meaning of a particular text (i.e., the United States 
Constitution)—would be compelled to a foregone conclusion: that it is 
impossible to account for what happens in the legal world if the area of 
research is restricted to the formal rules set out by the legitimate 
authority.1 An outcome, as we will see, that would bear out one of the 
fundamental tenets of American legal realism.2 
Indeed, two classic accounts of the United States Constitution—Robert 
Bork’s “orthodox” originalism and Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading” 
originalism—seem unable to account for the legal change of the 
Constitution’s “abstract clauses,” whose working example in this Article is 
going to be the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”3 I argue that, from the failure of these 
reconstructions, originalism cannot be deemed to fully account for 
constitutional practice.4 That is, if the Baudean question “Is originalism 
our law?”5 can be answered in the affirmative for the majority of 




1. The concept of “law,” i.e., as progressively conceived in the positivist tradition from 
Austin and Hart to Raz and Green. See generally Andrei Marmor & Alexander Sarch, The Nature of 
Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta, ed., rev. ed. 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/lawphil-nature/ [https://perma.cc/85RH-P4L5] 
(summarizing the shibboleths of legal positivism). 
2. The idea, i.e., of legal indeterminacy. See infra Part V.B. It might be worth emphasizing 
that the thesis is “truly realist” insofar as legal indeterminacy, as will see, results from the functioning 
of legal norms, and not, that is, from the broader problem of the “open-ended” status of the language. 
See BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEXAS L. 
REV. 267 (1997), reprinted in BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 27 (2007) [hereinafter LEITER, 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE] (contesting C.L.S. writers’ portrait of realism as inferring legal 
indeterminacy from the general nature of the language, rather than from essentially legal problems, 
e.g., alternative methods of legal interpretation or precedents’ selection). 
3. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” U.S CONST. amend. VIII. 
4. See infra Part IV.A. 
5. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015). 











These alleged limits of originalism’s descriptive power do not descend 
from some possibly true but less interesting facts, such as, for example, 
that judges make mistakes or misinterpret constitutional clauses in order to 
impose their moral views.7 After all, if we stretch the descriptive attitude 
of originalism, we might say that by accommodating these phenomena 
under the label of “improper practices,” an originalist model does account 
for them. On the contrary, as we will see, originalism collapses when it 
fails to qualify the legal change of abstract clauses either as legitimate or 
illegitimate, since the procedure it would mandate for their legal change 
has never been pursued nor has it been taken into consideration.8 
In Part I of the Article, I introduce Bork’s argument for originalism and 
Dworkin’s notion of abstract clauses. In Part II, I expound on why 
Dworkin’s theory is hardly tenable in regard to abstract clauses: In fact, 
his originalist explanation of the functioning of abstract clauses seems to 
turn out both “expensive” and “deficient.” In Part III, I develop a thought 
experiment—the “same law, new law” dilemma—which should cast doubt 
on the capacity of the “traditional” Borkean model to account for the 
referential change entailed in abstract clauses.9 In Part IV, I advocate the 
subsumption of this type of legal change into the conceptual framework of 
“informal constitutional change.”10  To depict my understanding of the 
nexus that hitches abstract clauses to other normative domains, I will 
resort to a fictional story inspired by the conflict of laws. Finally, in Part 
V, I confront the possibility of a linguistic treatment of abstract clauses, 
which seem to match the phenomenology of those expressions analytic 
philosophy dubs as “indexicals.”11 Disputing the utility of a “linguistic 
turn” in the understanding of abstract clauses, I contend that the legal 
 
 
7. “It is true, of course, that if judges are not rational, honest, or competent, or if they make 
mistakes, then the Class will be Causally Indeterminate, but this is plainly a less interesting point about 
the law.” BRIAN LEITER, A Note on Legal Indeterminacy, in LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, 
supra note 2, at 10–11. 
8. See infra Part III–IV. 
9. If Dworkin might be credited with raising the problem of abstract clauses, Bork never 
confronted the issue directly: He merely built an argument in favor of originalism out of the existence 
of the amendment procedure in the U.S. Constitution. See infra Part I.A. Hence the use of “Borkean” 
instead of “Bork’s.” See infra Part III.A. 
10. For other examples of informal constitutional change see, for example, Richard Albert, 
How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 387 (2015) 
(distinguishing between different types of informal constitutional change); Stephen M. Griffin, Against 
Historical Practice: Facing up to the Challenge of Informal Constitutional Change, 35 CONST. 
COMMENT. 79 (2020) (discussing the informal nature of constitutional practice). 
11. “The term indexicality was coined by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839–1914) to denote a particular kind of semiotic ‘ground.’” Constantine V. Nakassis, Indexicality’s 
Ambivalent Ground, 6 SIGNS & SOC’Y 281, 282 (2018). In the present article, however, the only 












change they entail can be addressed only through the type of inquiry 
suggested by American legal realism.  
Should the argument prove tenable, the bearing of the realists’ theses 
on constitutional law should be clearly reaffirmed. The inability of 
originalism to account for the referential change of abstract clauses is used 
to emphasize the necessity of the realist approach to constitutional law—
thus amending its “original” confinement to other fields of the law.12 
Certainly, there have already been numerous attempts to conjoin “realism” 
and constitutional law,13 just as the core work of political scientists can be 
framed as the inadvertent product of some realist research agenda in 
constitutional law.14 In both cases, however, some fundamental tenets of 
the realist jurisprudence might go missing. 
On the one hand, the expression “constitutional realism” is ambiguous 
and insufficient. It is ambiguous insofar as it can be used to describe the 
study of constitutional law from the perspective of “moral realism,” which 
 
 
12. Possibly as a consequence of their real lawyerly experience, American realists were 
mainly focused on issues arising from ordinary civil litigation rather than from the speculative 
problems of constitutional adjudication. As Brian Leiter notes, “[t]he Realists tend to draw their best 
examples . . . from the realm of commercial law . . . rather, say, than constitutional law . . . .” LEITER, 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 27. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 46–52 (Anchor Book 1963) (discussing the fictional example of the incorporation of a 
Taxi Company). 
13. See, e.g., Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to Identify the Complete 
Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 627–35 (2006) 
(arguing, from a study of New Zealand’s Unwritten Constitution, the importance of constitutional 
conventions to recognize the U.S. “complete Constitution”); Connie S. Rosati, Constitutional Realism, 
in DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY: NEW ESSAYS ON METAETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE 393, 396, 411 
(David Plunkett, Scott J. Shapiro & Kevin Toh eds., 2019) (arguing for the existence of true 
constitutional facts in a metaethical sense). 
14. As Brian Leiter writes—concurring in some remark from Frederick Schauer—“political-
science work on courts is a useful corrective to much doctrinal scholarship in constitutional law, which 
talks as though the doctrine is really explanatory of Supreme Court decisions.” Brian Leiter, Legal 
Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is The Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 113 n.11 (2010) 
[hereinafter Leiter, Legal Formalism]. It bears noting that Leiter is neither weighing the quality of 
“political-science work,” nor claiming that political science is the discipline supposed to bring to light 
the non-legal determinants of Supreme Court decisions. I will be exploring, and criticizing, these 
possible claims. For typical examples of political science scholarship on constitutional adjudication 
see, e.g., Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957) (arguing that Supreme Court’s policy-making—besides temporary 
moments of disagreements—does eventually conform with the currently dominant “alliance,” i.e., the 
actual majority’s political ideas); Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court in American Politics, 6 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 161, 171–73 (2003) (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in American law and 
arguing against an understatement of the efficacy of its decisions); more recently, Ran Hirschl, The 
Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 253, 271 (Robert E. 
Goodin ed., 2011) (arguing that judicial activism arises out of an institutional environment that calls 












has very little to do with American legal realism.15 Perhaps more 
importantly, the term is insufficient at times, as it is employed to 
(exclusively) describe those instances where judges fall short of applying 
clear legal rules, either because they are mistaken or, more frequently, 
because they have some vested interest that elicit the misuse of the law 
(e.g., they smuggle the enforcement of political moral views as the 
application of preexistent constitutional rules).16 Legal realism, however, 
is not merely a remedy for human fallibility or the deviant behavior of 
judges: It allegedly arises from the nature of legal rules, which are 
sometimes indeterminate—viz., the cases that are in fact litigated.17 As the 
analysis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in this Article 
demonstrates, abstract clauses are inherently “legally indeterminate” 
because there is unanimous consensus (even by political originalists!) that 
it should not be applied originalistically.18 
The difference is stark. In a possible world where the issue of fallacious 
or malignant judges were to be solved, the “minor realist account” of the 
law—that is, the one that attributes legal deviations to judicial errors or 
political abuse of the law—would match the “correct” scenario as 
conceived, namely, by originalists. American legal realism, instead, 
 
 
15. As the most prominent advocate of “constitutionalism realism” candidly acknowledges. 
See Rosati, supra note 13, at 411 (recognizing the incompatibility with American legal realism). See 
also Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 89 (1988) (contesting Barber’s alleged incompatibility of natural right and constitutional 
democracy). 
16. See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Originalism Off The Ground: A Response To Professors Baude 
And Sachs, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 313, 313–14, 323–36 (2019) (conflating legal realism with political 
science’s belief that the judges’ political values are the determinants of constitutional adjudication); 
Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, And The Interpretation Of “This 
Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1242, 1260–61 (1987) (describing instrumentalism and realism 
as the judicial philosophy of the Warren Court and interpreting the realists’ constitutional scholarship 
as an attempt to unveil the conservative biases of the New Deal Court); Richard Ekins & Graham Gee, 
Miller, Constitutional Realism and the Politics of Brexit, in THE UK CONSTITUTION AFTER MILLER: 
BREXIT AND BEYOND 249 (Mark Elliott, Jack Williams & Allison Young eds., 2018) (using the 
expression “constitutional realism” to describe the “optimal constitutional practice” from a political 
standpoint). Of course, there are also comprehensive, non-“politically reductive” accounts of realism 
in constitutional scholarship. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, And The 
Structural Role Of The Supreme Court In The U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 
185–95 (2011) (emphasizing the role of legal indeterminacy in realist jurisprudence); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law, Legal Realism, and Empirical Legal Science, 96 B.U. L. 
REV. 1359, 1369–71 (2016) (stressing the employment of other social sciences as one of the central 
“realist teachings” for constitutional law). 
17. See LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 19–20 (exposing C.L.S. 
writers’ account of the realists as supporters of general indeterminacy—i.e., of the thesis that the law is 
always indeterminate: “To the contrary, Realists were mainly concerned to point out the indeterminacy 
that exists in those cases that are actually litigated, especially those that make it to the stage of 
appellate review—a far smaller class of legal cases, and one where indeterminacy in law is far less 
surprising”). 











alleges that even in that world legal rules would not be, at times, causally 
explanatory of judicial decisions.19 It is not the case that clear legal 
outcomes are neglected simply because judges want to enforce some 
personal view: Sometimes the outcome is dictated by the very nature of 
the law.20 
On the other hand, I resist the possibility that the problems arising from 
constitutional law’s natural indeterminacy should be handed over to other 
social sciences. For one, political science scholarship about “realism in 
adjudication” often boils down to the minor thesis that deviations from 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution descend from the hidden 
“political” interests behind adjudication (e.g., strictly partisan biases, 
economic worldviews, religious commitments, etc.)21 In this respect, 
political scientists share in the insufficiency of “constitutional realism.”22  
Additionally, another fundamental idea of American legal realism 
would be “lost in translation” if other sciences were exclusively competent 
on the matter: the conception of legal scholarship as a “tool for lawyers” 
(i.e., a research activity that help lawyers win cases by deconstructing the 
extralegal rules that govern adjudication).23 In American legal realism, the 
rationale for legal scholarship is to predict adjudication and thereby 
enhance lawyers’ ability to win cases.24 Other disciplines, conversely, 
might rightfully be less sensitive to this point of view.25 Therefore, I argue 
 
 
19. “[T]he law on some point is causally indeterminate if the Class does not causally explain 
the judge’s decision.” LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 9. 
20. The fact that the illegality of the outcome does not come from some judicial failing but is 
mandated by the “nature of the law” is what makes the case of abstract clauses ultimately 
“interesting.” See id. at 9–10. 
21. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 11, 185–86 
(1998) (proposing a strategic model of Supreme Court adjudication where judge exclusively act to 
enforce personal ideological commitments, thus excluding mere obedience to the law); Hirschl, supra 
note 14, at 263–64 (reducing the causal role of constitutional catalogs of rights in prompting judicial 
activism to the enhancement of the “public’s rights awareness” and not to the very nature of those 
rights); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 195, 195–96, 214 (2011) (interpreting legal realism as 
the mere unveiling of ideological and political determinants and arguing that “American people 
understand judicial decisionmaking [sic] in realistic terms…and they do so under the belief that judges 
exercise their discretion in a principled and sincere fashion”). Contra Frank B. Cross, The Justices of 
Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998) (making a compelling case against political reductionism). See also 
Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. 
L. REV. 1457, 1473 (2016) (criticizing Whittington’s political interpretation of the rise of the “new 
originalism”). 
22. See infra Part V.B. 
23. See infra Part V.B (interpreting the realists as unaware forerunners of a naturalist and 
pragmatic approach to the law where the main object was to prophesize judicial decisions). 
24. See infra Part V.B.  
25. Political science, for example, seems less concerned with the lawyer’s point of view than 











that the legal inquiry has a specific and privileged point of view on the 
issue of legal indeterminacy. 
Having delineated the way in which the analysis reconsiders legal 
realism in constitutional law, three important caveats remain. First, the 
Borkean and Dworkinian antagonistic accounts are assumed as two 
“archetypes”26 for numerous originalist accounts of constitutional 
amending. However, these two models cannot faithfully exhaust the 
tapestry of originalist approaches. Any conclusion concerning these 
accounts should be subjected to the entire range of originalist 
reconstructions before legitimately claiming that it applies to originalism 
tout court.27  
However, a simple observation should lessen the perils of this 
evidential reduction. The two accounts are held here as descriptive, value-
free theories28—that is, they are assumed to be sincere descriptions of how 
the Constitution and the constitutional order were conceived to unfold by 
the Framers.29 (I do not address the question of whether this was Bork’s 
 
 
26. I owe Gary Lawson for suggesting the very useful term “archetype.” 
27. The Eighth Amendment, e.g., the Borkean account should roughly approximate Justice 
Scalia’s more famous one. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961–96 (1991) (Scalia, J.); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2259–68 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This Article falls short of 
considering John Stinneford’s recent, but eminently relevant originalist contribution to the 
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Stinneford’s account differs from Scalia’s 
and Bork’s insofar as he deems the Eighth Amendment notion of “unusual” to mean “contrary to long 
usage” or “contrary to the long standing traditions of common law.” John F. Stinneford, The Original 
Meaning of Unusual: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 
1745 (2008). Instead of a rule, the Framers embedded in the Constitution a device that would have 
yielded new applications as time passed. Since my main concern here is the limits of formal 
constitutional amending—i.e., not the Eighth Amendment per se—I do not address Stinneford’s 
position, which seems essentially concerned with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
However, his interpretation remains crucial for if it were to be right—and if the problems of the 
amendment of abstract clauses did not apply to constitutional provisions other than the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments”—the entire issue would be brought to a close. 
28. I use “value free” as the literary English translation for Weber’s expression “wertfrei.” 
See, e.g., Wilhelm Hennis, The Meaning of ‘Wertfreiheit’: On the Background and Motives of Max 
Weber’s “Postulate,” 12 SOC. THEORY 113 (1994). 
29. This is the “semantic” branch of originalism. See Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All 
Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT, LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 1, 
11–12 (2011) (expounding the distinction between normative and semantic originalism). As the 
difference with “political originalism” will come up several times in the text, I imagine a preliminary 
explanation might come in handy. The “semantic” (or “descriptive”) version of originalism is merely 
an interpretative enterprise, like the one described by Lawson and Seidman (“Our concern . . . is solely 
with the task of understanding, or expounding, the instruction manual that is the federal Constitution. 
We aim to describe the appropriate way to read and understand the instructions contained in the 
Constitution. We have nothing to say about whether any particular people, most notably public 
officials who carry firearms or command people who carry firearms, should try to follow the 
instructions in the Constitution once they are understood. That is a substantial question of political 
morality, not of interpretative theory, and we are not political moralists”). Gary Lawson & Guy 
Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 53 (2006). Conversely, 











and Dworkin’s intent or, more likely, if they were simply calling upon the 
Supreme Court to do better adjudication.)30 Through this potential 
distortion, the two accounts should cover much of contemporary 
constitutional debate. If Dworkin’s approach, for example, might be read 
as the “descriptive account” within Fleming’s recent defense of 
constitutional “moral reading”31 or the “new new originalism’s” emphasis 
on the “high level of generality” of abstract clauses,32 a descriptive 
Borkean account should agree with Gary Lawson’s “empirical reading” of 
the Constitution.33 In this respect, it is striking to see how any “new” 
proposal for constitutional adjudication tends to boil down to the particular 
role abstract clauses play in constitutional interpretation.34 
Secondly, this research falls into place as a “case study”: The Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is considered an 
example for the entire genre of abstract clauses. However, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, or the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause 
could have filled the role.35 In choosing to analyze the Cruel and Unusual 
 
 
adjudication should be carried out by officials and citizens—namely, the claim that they should always 
defer to the original meaning of the Constitution. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2009) (holding this normative stance to be originalism’s central case). 
30. As for Dworkin, it ought to be noted, this would simply mean acknowledging the 
morality entailed in every possible adjudication, not really changing the adjudicative approach. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]. 
31. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION 73–97 (2015) 
(proposing an interpretation of the Constitution as a catalog of “conceptions,” i.e., abstract moral 
principles that should be differently understood over time and charging originalism with 
authoritarianism). 
32. See Peter J. Smith, How Different are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 707, 718 (2011) (“The new new originalists’ claim that some provisions of the Constitution ought 
to be interpreted at a high level of generality . . . .”). 
33. That is, an account of the constitutional order (merely) as envisaged in the original 
meaning of the Constitution, albeit actualized, in the sense that it comprises of all the objects that the 
“criteria for determining the referents” might allow. Cf. Lawson, supra note 21, at 1471 (describing the 
“empirical reader” as the interpreter whose exclusive interest is the ascertainment of the “criteria for 
determining the referents of the concepts employed by the hypothetical reader [of the Constitution]”). 
See infra Part III.B. 
34. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/ 
[https://perma.cc/BLQ9-L986] (contending that the “majestic generalities and ambiguities of the 
written Constitution” allow for a “substantive moral reading” inspired to the “common good”). 
35. Dworkin explicitly regarded these clauses as other instances that occasioned the “moral 
reading” of the Constitution. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 











Punishments Clause, I simply followed in Dworkin’s36 and other scholars’ 
footsteps.37  
In the third place, this Article holds “originalism” to be roughly 
coextensive with the jurisprudential concept of “formalism.”38 That is, if 
possible, even a bolder and riskier move.39 Originalism and formalism 
remain controversial concepts: Confusion about originalism becomes less 
of a problem when compared with the entanglement over legal formalism, 
which at times seems to turn murkier the more it is clarified.40 
As Frederick Schauer illustrates, there seems to be at least consensus 
that “formalism” entails: a) the idea of “decisionmaking [sic] according to 
rule” and b) the “screening off from a decisionmaker [of] factors that a 
sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.”41 Following 
Brian Leiter’s straightforward epistemology, originalism relates to 
formalism as one of the several methods through which the legitimate 
sources of law ought to be legitimately interpreted.42 In this respect, 
formalism is more properly understood in juxtaposition with legal realism: 
Where the former affirms the determinacy of legal reasons and their 
weight in orientating adjudication, the latter contends that legal reasons are 
not able to determine one outcome in all instances.43 In these “deviant 
cases,” judges primarily respond to the “stimulus of the fact”44 and only 




36. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue]. 
37. See, e.g., Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 265 (2002) (resorting to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause as the subject of scrutiny). 
38. For a different, albeit intertwined, meaning of the word “formalism” in constitutional 
law, see Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 
859–60 (1990) (“Formalism, at least in my hands, is an application of originalist textualism to 
questions of constitutional structure”).  
39. Although surely frequent in legal literature. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting 
Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2001); Lael K. Weis, What Comparativism Tells Us About Originalism, 11 INT. J. CON. L. 842, 852 
(2013); Stephanos Bibas, Justice Scalia’s Originalism and Formalism: The Rule of Criminal Law as a 
Law of Rules, in THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: REMEMBERING A CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
TITAN’S IMPACT ON THE LAW 5 (Elizabeth H. Slattery ed., 2016). 
40. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986) (excluding, quite surprisingly, 
the possibility of a formalist interpretation of statutes and constitutions). 
41. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988). 
42. LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 9. 
43. Id. at 23–24. 
44. Id. at 37. 











Is it legitimate, then, to conflate originalism with formalism? To a 
certain extent, it is unavoidable: An originalist application of the law 
would generally be regarded as formalistic in nature.46 The converse, 
however, might not be similarly correct. Formalism is better understood as 
an evaluation of the whole class of legal sources, whereas originalism is 
concerned only with legal texts (mainly, though not exclusively, regarding 
the U.S. Constitution).47 In this respect, originalism boils down to a 
necessary ingredient of formalism but is not coextensive with it.48 
It is striking to see, however, that criticisms of formalism and 
originalism are often indistinguishable. Both legal positions are rejected as 
flawed interpretative tools or because of their political myopia.49 Similarly, 
 
 
46. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 91 
(1995) (“Formalists believe that certainty, stability, and logic are the primary values to be sought by 
judges . . . . To implement these values, they embrace formalist methods, such as textualism as a 
system for interpreting statutes, adherence to established doctrine in common-law cases, and 
originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting beyond 
Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2001) 
(considering originalism as paradigmatic instance of formalism); Andre LeDuc, Competing Accounts 
of Interpretation and Practical Reasoning in the Debate over Originalism, 16 U.N.H. L. REV. 51, 93 
(2017) (“Originalism offers a formalistic account of constitutional reasoning.”). Contra Stephanos 
Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely 
Friend of Criminal Defendants, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, (2005) (juxtaposing formalism and originalism). 
47. As for statutory law, there is a marked preference for speaking of “textualism” and 
“intentionalism,” instead of “originalism.” See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in 
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L & PUBL. POL’Y 59, 59 (1988) (“For constitutional interpretation, 
a debate rages among originalists who look to history and intent; structuralists who look to the 
problems at hand and the structure of the document; nonoriginalists who look to “values” implicit in 
the document and say that anything achieving more of an identified value is permissible . . . . For 
statutes, however, there is no similar debate.”).  
On the contrary, it is unlikely to come across an “originalist application of common law,” 
although it is perfectly normal to speak about a formalist interpretation thereof. Examples from 
contract law, either for or against formalism, are sufficiently revealing. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. 
LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1–23 (2d ed. 1880) (expounding common law’s 
offer and acceptance rules); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? – An Essay in Perspective, 48 
YALE L.J. 15–16 (1931) (undermining rules’ ability to dictate only one outcome—e.g., did the 
carpenter who did not reply to an offer implicitly accept it as she began fabricating the good?). 
It seems as though the place of precedents and common law in the originalist debate is 
restricted to the stress stare decisis might exert on constitutional originalism. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, 
The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Richard H. 
Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 570 (2001). 
48. This is also why Leiter considers originalism one of the “legitimate methods of 
interpreting the sources of law.” LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 9. 
49. Paul Brest’s rejection of “moderate originalism” is still an enduring example of clarity 
and intellectual honesty. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204, 224–38 (1980). He first lays out a critique of forms of originalism that seem to be 
interpretatively unworkable. Id. at 223–24. Then, he admits the paramount need for a constitutional 
interpretation that agrees with certain Supreme Court’s precedents. If an originalist construction of the 
Constitution does not comport with those rulings (and, implicitly, with the “ends of 
constitutionalism”), then U.S. citizens are better off with another interpretative method he calls “mere 











it is hard to find proponents of originalism that do not adhere at least to 
some level of formalism.50 
One possible reason for the conflation of the two concepts is that they 
are often presented as though they share a common normative goal. 
Allegedly, both originalism and formalism aim at constraining the judge’s 
lawmaking appetite by cultivating the idea of the judiciary as some sort of 
“null power.”51 This is evidently true of the Borkean originalism, but it 
 
 
however, treating them as authoritative, generally serves the ends of constitutionalism better than 
originalist interpretation.” Id. at 224. The choice between originalism and nonoriginalism should rest 
on a pragmatic answer to the following question: “How well, compared to possible alternatives, does 
the practice contribute to the well-being of our society—or, more narrowly, to the ends of 
constitutional government?” Id. at 226.  
Political criticism of originalist adjudication is perhaps more straightforward in politics. For 
example, consider Hon. Dianne Feinstein’s opening statement in Neil Gorsuch’s Supreme Court 
confirmation hearing:  
Judge Gorsuch has also stated that he believes judges should look to the original public 
meaning of the Constitution when they decide what a provision of the Constitution means. 
This is personal, but I find this originalist judicial philosophy to be really troubling. In 
essence, it means the judges and courts should evaluate our constitutional rights and 
privileges as they were understood in 1789. However, to do so would not only ignore the 
intent of the Framers that the Constitution would be a framework on which to build, but it 
severely limits the genius of what our Constitution upholds. . . . In fact, if we were to 
dogmatically adhere to originalist interpretations, then we would still have segregated schools 
and bans on interracial marriage. Women would not be entitled to equal protection under the 
law, and government discrimination against LGBT Americans would be permitted. So I am 
concerned when I hear that Judge Gorsuch is an originalist and a strict constructionist. 
The Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Confirmation Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 8–9 (2018) 
(Opening Statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
Against formalism, there had been many critiques on the grounds of the bad policy results it 
might give rise to. Generally, they were framed out of some natural law theory. This is implicit, e.g., in 
the widely known Formula of Gustav Radbruch, who regarded positivism to be roughly identical to 
what we ordinarily call “formalism” (“The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be 
resolved in this way: The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when 
its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute and justice 
reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as ‘flawed law’, must yield to justice”). Gustav 
Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL ST. 1, 7 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson, trans., 2006). 
50. Justice Antonin Scalia, e.g., held textualism to be coextensive with originalism and 
crisply captured the overlapping criticism toward formalism and originalism: “Of all the criticisms 
leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, of course 
it’s formalistic! The rule of law is about form.” Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Gutmann ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law]. See also Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical 
Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 379 (2013) (“The first point of substantial agreement among 
modern originalists is an emphasis on original meaning of the constitutional text. Justice Scalia has 
referred to this by the somewhat misleading label of ‘textualism’”). 
51. “Among the three powers of which we have spoken, that of judging is in some fashion, 
null.” MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 160 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller & Harold S. 











also applies to Dworkin’s “moral reading” originalism, albeit for very 
different reasons.52  
For purposes of this Article, I will be using originalism and formalism 
interchangeably here. It is important to bear in mind, however, that there 
exists a notable sense in which formalism is broader an enterprise than 
originalism. 
I. ARTICLE V AND THE ABSTRACT-CONCRETE CLAUSES DISTINCTION 
A. Bork’s Originalist Argument 
Although this Part is going to debate Dworkin’s account of 
constitutional clauses, I think the very best way to conceive of it remains 
as a critique of some traditional account of the U.S. Constitution, whose 
perfect example is Bork’s adamant reconstruction. Therefore, I will be 
touching on the main traits of a “Borkean Constitution” for the purpose of 
a fruitful discussion of Dworkin’s alternate interpretation—only to take 
the former back once the soundness of Dworkin’s alternative has been put 
into question.53  
In his famous book on the “political seduction of the law,”54 Robert 
Bork formulated a powerful rationale for an originalist account of the U.S. 
Constitution. More precisely, for holding that the Constitution was meant 
to be construed in an originalist fashion (what he notably described as “the 
original understanding of original understanding”).55 The argument hinges 
on the provision of rules for constitutional amendments, whose meaning 
would dangle in the air if “constitutional revisionism”56 were to be 
considered a legitimate practice in the law.57 
As Bork demonstrates, 
[w]hen we speak of “law,” we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have 
no right to change except through prescribed procedures. That 
 
 
52. This is why Leiter, e.g., does not shrink from describing Dworkin as the “leading 
theoretical spokesman” of the “Sophisticated Formalists.” Leiter, Legal Formalism, supra note 14, at 
112. 
53. See infra Part III. 
54. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
(1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING]. 
55. Id. at 153. 
56. By “constitutional revisionism,” Bork refers both to the fact of judges who “legislate 
from the bench”—what ordinarily goes under the name of “judicial activism”—and to theories that 
claim that the original understanding is not controlling of constitutional adjudication. See id. at 15–18. 
Although the issues are connected, they are not identical. Here, however, “constitutional revisionism” 
is simply synonymous with “judicial activism.” See infra note 139. 











statement assumes that the rule has a meaning independent of our 
own desires. Otherwise there would be no need to agree on 
procedures for changing the rule. Statutes, we agree, may be 
changed by amendment or repeal. The Constitution may be changed 
by amendment pursuant to the procedures set out in article V. It is a 
necessary implication of the prescribed procedures that neither 
statute nor Constitution should be changed by judges. Though that 
has been done often enough, it is in no sense proper.58 
Even if the idea of a “necessary implication” should not be taken literally, 
we could easily feel tempted to agree with Bork that the establishment of 
certain procedures for the amendment of the Constitution is presumably 
deemed to exclude the legitimacy of different, unentrenched modes of 
constitutional change (e.g., we would hold illegitimate a constitutional 
amendment formally enacted by the sole President of the United States, 
even if acclaimed in a subsequent popular vote).59 Were judges supposed 
to update the “referential content of a rule”—which Brest described as the 
sum of its “subjective exemplary applications” and its “conventional 
exemplary applications”60—to current times’ different worldviews, what 
would be the point in arranging Article V’s procedures? 
It is important to emphasize that, for the purposes of this research, the 
Borkean descriptive model of abstract clauses is not “flawed” merely 
because of the reality of nonoriginalist judicial practice.61 As long as it is 
possible to give a qualification to this nonoriginalist behavior—namely, an 
 
 
58. Id. at 143. 
59. But see Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) (“I believe that the first, most undeniable, inalienable 
and important, if unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a majority of voters to amend the 
Constitution—even in ways not expressly provided for by Article V.”). See also Akhil R. Amar, The 
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 
(1994). Contra Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional 
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 158–59 (1996). See also Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: 
Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 191–92 (1997). 
60. Brest, supra note 49, at 21. In describing one lawmaker’s intentions in regard to some 
enacted ordinance, Brest identified three sources that make up for the rule’s reference: First, the 
“instances of the rule's application which passed through [the lawmaker’s] mind during the process of 
adopting it” (i.e., “the subjective exemplary applications of the rule”); secondly, the instances entailed 
by the “the language of the rule you drafted, which implies conventional exemplary applications” (i.e., 
“those [instances] that your language would suggest to other members of your society”); possibly, “the 
undesirable consequences that you hoped to avoid by enacting the rule” might make their way to the 
rule’s referent. Id. However, in regard with this third element of the rules’ content we might go a little 
further in Brest’s tentative doubt (“though I am not certain how independent this is from the first two”) 
and dismiss it beforehand: The “undesirable consequences” are either included in the first two sources 
of law’s referent or inhere the abstractive thinking of the “sublimation of intention” I will try to reject 
in Part II, and therefore do not take part in the rule’s referent. 
61. See supra Introduction. In the case of Bork, constitutional practice is nonoriginalist when 











“improper behavior”—the descriptive capability of Bork’s account is not 
completely impaired.62 Instead, the challenge abstract clauses pose to 
Borkean originalism is a more radical one, since their actual legal change 
is illegitimate from an originalist point of view and at the same time hardly 
any originalist would demand that they are legitimately changed.63 The 
factual impracticality of the Borkean model is what ultimately thwarts a 
fully originalist description of American constitutional practice.64 
A major rejection of Bork’s argument is found in the interpretation of 
the U.S. Constitution asserted by Ronald Dworkin, whose peculiar 
originalism must be addressed before attempting any critique of the 
Borkean originalist account.65 Were Dworkin’s ideas sound and reliable, a 
flaw in the Borkean originalist model would be meaningless. Moreover, 
there is an expository benefit in postponing the critique of Borkean 
originalism: Its failure, as we will see, yields something of greater interest 
than the pitfalls of Dworkin’s account. 
B. The Abstract Clauses of the Constitution and “Expectations 
Originalism” 
While discussing the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, Dworkin stated: 
We have to choose between an abstract, principled, moral reading—
the authors meant to prohibit punishments that are in fact cruel as 
well as unusual . . . —and a concrete, dated reading—they meant to 
say that punishments widely thought cruel as well as unusual at the 
time they spoke . . . are prohibited. If the correct interpretation is the 
abstract one, then judges attempting to keep faith with the text today 
must sometimes ask themselves whether punishments the Framers 
would not themselves have considered cruel—capital punishment, 
for example—nevertheless are cruel . . . . If the correct 
interpretation is the dated one, on the other hand, these questions 
would be out of place, at least as part of an exercise in textual 
fidelity, because the only questions a dated understanding would 
pose is the question of what the Framers or their audience thought.66 
 
 
62. See infra Part III.A. 
63. See infra Part III.A. 
64. See infra Part IV.B. 
65. See infra Part II. 











Dworkin talks here of two “readings” of the Eighth Amendment’s 
clause—an  “abstract” and a “concrete” one. At a general level, he is 
positing a fundamental distinction between two types of clauses: “concrete 
clauses”—such as Article II’s requirement that the President of the United 
States “have attained to the Age of thirty five Years”67—and abstract ones 
(e.g., the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).68 
A concrete clause “commands what it says” and calls for an ordinary 
application of the law.69 In contrast, an abstract clause demands that judges 
make a “moral judgment”:70 The judge’s task regarding abstract clauses is 
not to seek the possible understanding of the clause at the time of 
enactment (i.e., in the case of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 
the punishments widely thought cruel and unusual at the time of the 
Framers). Instead, judges are supposed to ask themselves what would be 
considered an instance of the clause, had it been enacted today.71 For 
clauses such as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition, the Framers did not 
merely mean to outlaw the specific behaviors covered by those clauses at 
the time of their enactment, but to establish provisions that prohibited all 
such future behaviors. 
To conceive of an abstract clause as a concrete one is surely possible: 
Indeed, this is the very error all Borkean originalists make.72 Conversely, 
when interpreted as abstract clauses, concrete clauses end up ascribing 
“silly” intentions to the Framers.73 This is how we determine which 
clauses are concrete: It is a “Silliness test.” For example, the requirement 
that the President of the United States be at least 35 years of age can surely 
be construed as whatever age might be indicative of due emotional age.74 
 
 
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
68. For one of the first scholarly uses of the concrete-abstract clauses distinction to describe 
Dworkin’s constitutional interpretation see Connie S. Rosati, The Moral Reading of Constitutions, in 
THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN 323, 325 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2016). I guess it 
is not reckless to say that Dworkin’s clauses’ distinction is a projection of its rules-principles 
distinction. See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. It might be Dworkin’s interpreters’ competence to decide 
which has caused which (i.e., if the abstract clauses of the Constitution have prompted the idea of legal 
principles, or vice versa).  
69. See infra Part III.A. 
70. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1254–55. 
71. Id. at 1253. 
72. See infra Part III.A (exploring an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as a concrete 
clause). 
73. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1252. 
74. Id. (emphasis added). See also Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in 
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686–87 (1985) (contemplating extensive 











The “due emotional age” could have been 35 years at the time but be 
different now, at a future historical moment.75  
This, however, cannot be the case since, as Dworkin says,  
[i]t would have been silly of them to have conditioned eligibility for 
the presidency on a property so inherently vague and controversial 
as that of emotional age, and there is no evidence of any such 
intention. We can make sense of their saying what they said only by 
supposing them to have meant chronological age.76 
We can make the best sense of Dworkin’s “making the best of” arguments 
when read as “inferences to the best explanation,” although this reading 
does not always seem as viable as in this instance.77 
The outlined summary may seem complicated, and even though 
Dworkin’s theory’s sketchy state makes every attempt to elucidate it a 
tentative operation, we can gain clarity from breaking it down. To explain 
the difference, we can once again consider the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, which can be interpreted both as a concrete clause 
and as an abstract clause. If interpreted as “concrete,” the clause displays 
the familiar form ∀(x) (Ptx→ Fx) where P is the relevant property (i.e., P 
= being cruel and unusual), F is the property of “being Forbidden” and t is 
the clause enactment’s time (i.e., in the case of the Eighth Amendment, t1 
= 1791). If we hold it to be abstract, instead, the complexity of the clause 
increases because the time-reference becomes a variable itself and not a 
fixed value: Abstract clauses show a logical structure of the type ∀(x) 
(P∀(Y)x→ Fx) where ∀(Y) would be the time at which the reader interprets 
the clause: most significantly, the time at which the judge is required to 
 
 
75. “[W]hat would be alarming to several contemporary politicians . . . .” Dworkin, The 
Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1252. 
76. Id. 
77. Dworkin’s “it-would-be-silly” or “make-the-best-sense” arguments can be framed as 
inferences to the best explanation (i.e., among several possible interpretations of the same evidential 
data we choose the ones that are explanatorily superior). See Igor Douven, Abduction, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/ 
[perma.cc/95KX–76XZ] (discussing inference to the best explanation). In some instances, Dworkin 
explicitly mentions the expression “best explanation.” DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 35, at 
2. However, it is hard to reduce all of Dworkin’s kindred statements to inferences to the best 
explanation. Consider, e.g., his contention that the Equal Protection Clause cannot be reduced to a ban 
on hidden discriminations so that overt racial differentiations be permitted. See id. at 9. That must be 
so, Dworkin explains, for “Congressmen of the victorious nation, trying to capture the achievements 
and lessons of a terrible war, would be very unlikely to settle for anything so limited and insipid . . . .” 
Id. (emphasis added). This kind of statement seems more properly significant if explained through 
Dworkin’s troublesome belief in some objective morality, rather than read as an inference appealing to 












apply the clause (e.g., t2 = 2021).78 The reference of Dworkinian abstract 
clauses is thus peculiarly context-dependent.79 
Of course, Dworkin’s use of expressions such as “considered cruel” or 
“thought cruel”80 when speaking of punishments under the Eighth 
Amendment raises the question: what is the point of view under which 
these concepts are to be evaluated? Supporters of capital punishment and 
abolitionists, for example, may retain quite different ideas about which 
punishments are “in fact . . . cruel and unusual.”81 Dworkin seems aware 
of this issue: 
Does that mean punishments that the authors thought were cruel or 
(what probably comes to the same thing) punishments that were 
judged cruel by the popular opinion of their day? Or does it mean 
punishments that are in fact—according to the correct standards for 
deciding such matters—cruel?82 
The Silliness test, however, works only as an exclusionary tool by which 
we can tell the concrete clauses from the abstract ones. Either we think 
there cannot be another type of clause, or we might need a positive 
criterion to discern the abstract clauses within the U.S. Constitution. 
Dworkin provides us with such by resorting to a loose inference from the 
“abstract language” the Framers used in crafting the other clauses of the 
Constitution: 
The Framers were careful statesmen who knew how to use the 
language they spoke. We cannot make good sense of their behavior 
unless we assume that they meant to say what people who use the 
words they used would normally mean to say—that they used 
abstract language because they intended to state abstract 
principles.83 
In other words, the abstract language reveals the nature of the clause itself. 
Leaving aside for a moment the question of the inference’s soundness, one 
can still brood over how an abstract principle should factually play out: 
“Okay, you have persuaded us that your interpretation is sound, Professor 
 
 
78. If the time reference t1 is fixed in concrete clauses, in abstract clauses t2 is itself a 
function of the interpreter’s particular time. 
79. The temporal shift is relevant to the extent it implies a change in the conventional 
understanding of linguistic expressions (e.g., the reference of “cruel and unusual punishments), which 
at the same time reflect a shift in the social sensibility toward factual matters (e.g., the societal 
perception of cruelty and usualness). See infra Part III.B. 
80. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1253. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1252. 











Dworkin, but how are we supposed to apply an abstract principle when we 
come across one?” Here Dworkin summons up his famous notion of “law 
as integrity”:84 
We must ask: What is really cruel? What does equal citizenship 
really require? What legislation is consistent with due process of 
law, given that legal integrity is of the essence of law's process, and 
that integrity requires that the liberties our culture recognizes in 
broad principle—freedom of conscience, for example—must be 
respected in individual legislative decisions about, for example, 
freedom of choice in dying?85 
One may wonder whether Dworkin simply names “integrity” what others 
would call “justice,” so that the application of the Constitution merely 
calls for its evaluation in accordance with some external (allegedly 
superior) moral system.86 But Dworkin seems to dismiss this possibility.87 
“Law as integrity” does not imply any mingling of adjudication with 
subjective political values (i.e., adjudication as to fit one own’s personal 
idea of “integrity”), since law is not “political philosophy”: 
[A]ny strategy of constitutional argument that aims at overall 
constitutional integrity must search for answers that mesh well 
enough with our practices and traditions—that find enough foothold 
in our continuing history as well as in the Constitution's text—so 
that those answers can plausibly be taken to describe our 
commitments as a nation. If I were trying to answer the question of 
what equal citizenship means as a philosophical exercise, for 
example, I would insist that citizens are not treated as equals by 
their political community unless that community guarantees them at 
least a decent minimum standard of housing, nutrition and medical 
care. But if the Supreme Court were suddenly to adopt that view, 
and to announce that states have a constitutional duty to provide 
universal health care, it would have made a legal mistake, because it 
 
 
84. “These are difficult questions. Citizens, lawyers, and judges should not try to answer 
them on a clean slate, ignoring the answers that others, particularly judges, have given to them in the 
past.” Id. at 1254. Dworkin’s “political integrity” consists of a “political” and an “adjudicative 
principle.” See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 178. What bears relevance to the present 
inquiry is the latter one. “According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or 
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best 
constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.” Id. at 225. 
85. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1254 (emphasis added). 
86. In this sense, Dworkin’s “integrity” and Radbruch’s “justice” would be one and the same. 
See Radbruch, supra note 49. 











would be attempting to graft into our constitutional system 
something that (in my view) doesn't fit at all.88 
Dworkin does not make explicit how the application of the law, qua an 
exercise in “constructive interpretation,”89 should play out. However, he 
may be implying one when he warns against the conflation of the Framers’ 
“semantic intentions” with their “political” ones: “It is a fallacy to infer, 
from the fact that the semantic intentions of historical statesmen inevitably 
fix what the document they made says, that keeping faith with what they 
said means enforcing the document as they hoped or expected or assumed 
it would be enforced.”90 
Although Dworkin resorts to a controversial example to depict the 
distinction,91 we can glean the difference between semantic and political 
intentions from Dworkin’s reply to Justice Scalia in a different occasion.92 
If we assume that “expectation originalism” equates the interpretation by 
the said political intentions, then Dworkin provides us with a prima facie 
solution: “‘[S]emantic originalism’ . . . takes what the legislators meant 
collectively to say as decisive of constitutional meaning, and ‘expectation 
originalism’ . . . makes decisive what they expected to accomplish in 
saying what they did.”93 If that is the case, Dworkin’s interpretation boils 
down to a rejection of what originalist scholarship has often called 
“expectations originalism.”94 
This is not the only possible interpretation of Dworkin’s words. As 
Keith Whittington hypothesizes, maybe Dworkin is simply maintaining 
that the Framers postulated the existence of moral entities such as an 
objective “concept of cruelty” (i.e., they assumed that “moral terms such 
as ‘cruel’ have real, substantive content apart from conventional 
beliefs”).95 The interpretation would agree, incidentally, with Dworkin’s 
own “ungrounded value realism” where “moral conviction” happens to be 
coupled with “mathematics.”96 Is Dworkin really regarding moral entities 
 
 
88. Id. at 1254. 
89. “We must begin, in my view, by asking what—on the best evidence available—the 
authors of the text in question intended to say. That is an exercise in what I have called constructive 
interpretation.” Id at. 1252. 
90. Id. at 1255. 
91. See infra Part III.A (confronting this example as an instance of Dworkin’s dubious 
conception of communication). 
92. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1257–58. 
93. Id. at 1256. 
94. Whittington, supra note 50, at 383 n.49 (“Ronald Dworkin forcefully argued against a 
kind of expectations originalism . . . .”). 
95. Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's “Originalism”: The Role of Intentions in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 62 REVIEW OF POLITICS 197, 198–221 (2000). 











as some sort of abstract object as classes and numbers? Is he further 
maintaining that the Framers held such a view?  
As we shall see, these are key questions in coming to terms with 
Dworkin’s scholarship.97 However, if that is the case, his ideas can hardly 
be subject to rational debate.98 Moreover, as Whittington and Lawson have 
pointed out, it would remain an open question for historical inquiry 
whether the Framers intended abstract clauses to refer to moral entities 
such as the true notion of “cruelty,” or to some historical understanding 
thereof.99 It would be curious to envisage the fate of abstract clauses if it 
turned out that such moral entities—whose existence is, at best, 
controversial—were the Framers’ expected referential content. What then 
if those moral objective entities happened not to exist?  
For this study, I will assume Dworkin’s reference to “political 
intentions” as synonymous to “expectations” or “expected applications 
originalism.” Therefore, I argue that it is not necessary to engage in a 
historical reconstruction for rejecting Dworkin’s view. One could simply 
realize how problematic Dworkin’s account—as every interpretation that 
severs the link with the “expected applications” of any normative act—
becomes from a strictly interpretative point of view. Were Dworkin 
correct in his approach, in fact, we would have to revise some traditional 
ideas on constitutional rigidity and, more generally, on action and 
commutative acts. And we might be well justified in refusing to do so. 
II. THE DWORKINIAN ORIGINALIST 
A. Updating the Abstract-Concrete Clauses Distinction 
Before identifying the shortcomings in Dworkin’s account, a 
fulfillment of his model can be profitably carried out. Taken at face value, 
the theory is exposed both to mild and serious criticism which can both be 
avoided through a refinement of Dworkin’s theory.  
 
 
97. See infra Part III.A. 
98. I am holding here to some rough noncognitivist belief on the ethical discourse. “What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS 89 (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinnes trans., Routledge 2001) [hereinafter 
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS]. See also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LECTURE ON ETHICS: 
INTRODUCTION, INTERPRETATION AND COMPLETE TEXT 132–239 (Edoardo Zamuner, E. Valentina Di 
Lascio & David Levy, eds. 2007) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, ETHICS] (attacking rationalist 
reductions of the problem of justice and morality). It ought to be mentioned that Wittgenstein’s 
thought has been interpreted also as a legitimization for some kind of moral cognitivism. See Patrick 
Oobuyck, Wittgenstein and the Shift from Noncognitivism to Cognitivism in Ethics, 36 
METAPHILOSOPHY 381 (2005) (emphasizing the difference between foundationalism and cognitivism). 











Dworkin only implied the following conclusion, which we have to 
explicate if we are to shield his theory from the range of Bork’s 
argument.100 Unlike abstract clauses, concrete clauses are not only subject 
to, but also the reason for the existence of the amending rules set out in 
Article V. This is an important clarification insofar as it provides the 
model with a rationale for the procedures set out in Article V—thus 
supplying a “target” for their meaning. This refinement neutralizes the 
criticism from Bork, who held up the potential meaninglessness of Article 
V’s procedures as a strong argument against the likelihood that 
constitutional judicial updates had been endorsed by the Framers.101 
After this preliminary adjustment, Dworkin’s account of constitutional 
rules has to undergo a more significant improvement, for its actual state 
paves the way to the aforementioned objection. When the judges who are 
supposed to perform the “moral judgment” seek the point of view from 
which to discern the several “objects of the world” that are meant to be 
encompassed by the clause at the moment of its application,102 who is the 
normative agent of the judgment? In the case of the Eighth Amendment, 
whose sense of cruelty and unusualness is to be used as touchstone in 
distinguishing a viable sanction from an abusive punishment? This is what 
John Stinneford appropriately calls “The Who Decides? Problem.”103 
In this respect, it is possible to buttress Dworkin’s theory by assuming 
that judges apply the will of “the People of the United States”104 by 
performing some broad democratic appreciation of the concept itself at 
any given time. The judge is thus deemed to assess, to the best of their 
abilities, the majority’s opinion on the several concepts the abstract clause 
entails at the time of enactment. Insofar as originalism deems it possible to 
ascertain the intent of the Framers, or—in the “original public meaning 
version”105—of a hypothetical “reasonable person”106 at the time, the 
possibility of gauging what the majority of the population considers 
“cruel” or “unusual” in a certain moment does not seem to amount to any 
 
 
100. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 54, at 143. 
101. Id. 
102. That is, the punishments perceived to be cruel and unusual at the reader’s time (“∀(Y)”). 
See supra Part I.B. 
103. Stinneford, supra note 27, at 1751. 
104. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
105. As is widely known, “original intent originalism” centers on the subjective intentions of 
the Framers—somewhat differently from their “expected applications” of constitutional provisions—
whereas the “original public meaning originalism” consists of the meaning a reasonable person would 
have gathered by reading the constitutional text at that time. See generally Whittington, supra note 50, 
at 375 (discussing the history and the key ideas revolving around originalism). 
106. “[W]e do not really look for subjective legislative intent. We look for a sort of 
“objectified” intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law . . . .” 











heavier interpretative burden. In the same way, we can cope with the 
instinctive dissatisfaction that arises before Dworkin’s puzzling use of 
“appraisive”107 concepts (e.g., when he speaks of “punishments that are in 
fact cruel as well as unusual” without specifying what “in fact” actually 
refers to. “In fact,” should read here as “at the time”).108  
It bears noting that Dworkin’s account happens to embody the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s “Evolving Standards of Decency” jurisprudence.109 In 
the context of the proportionality of punishments, the Supreme Court 
stated that  
if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to [the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments] advocates, we cannot think that it was 
intended to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts’, or to prevent 
only an exact repetition of history. We cannot think that the 
possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms 
of punishment was overlooked.110 
The evolving and forward-looking aspect of the clause finds itself 
generalized in Justice Cardozo’s famous dictum that “the great generalities 
of the Constitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to 
age.”111 
B. The Sublimation of Intention: The Expensiveness of Dworkin’s 
Reconstruction 
1. The Purpose for a Rigid Constitution 
I shall call “sublimation of intention” the process of stripping the 
intention of an action of its foreseeable outcomes. In Dworkin’s model, 
this takes place when abstract clauses are detached from their foreseeable 
 
 
107. Walter B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 
171 (1955–1956). 
108. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1253 (emphasis added). But see infra 
Part III.B (interpreting Dworkin as a metaphysical scholar who admitted the existence of moral 
entities). 
109. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (“The Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ must be interpreted according to its text, by 
considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the 
constitutional design. To implement this framework this Court has established the propriety and 
affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be ‘cruel and 
unusual’”). The “evolving standard of decency” formula was historically coined in Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
110. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 











instances of application (i.e., the cases the Framers conceived or would 
have regarded as regulated by those clauses) and turn them into 
empowerment on future interpreters to restate the referential content of 
those clauses.112 The sublimation consists of climbing from one concrete 
layer of intention (e.g., “flogging is forbidden”) to a higher one (e.g., 
“since flogging has been forbidden because it was deemed an excessively 
cruel punishment, then all excessively cruel punishments are to be 
forbidden”). The reasoning may then increase: “Since excessively cruel 
punishments were forbidden because they were deemed excessively cruel 
acts, then all excessively cruel acts are to be forbidden”; “since 
excessively cruel acts have been forbidden because they were deemed 
wrong acts, then all excessively wrong acts are to be forbidden,” and so 
forth. 
As Bork originally posited, while considering Griswold v. 
Connecticut’s principle that the State of Connecticut’s statute prohibiting 
the use of contraceptives by married couples was unconstitutional on the 
grounds of an expanded “right to privacy”:113 
Why does the principle extend only to married couples? Why, out 
of all forms of sexual behavior, only to the use of contraceptives? 
Why, out of all forms of behavior, only to sex? The question of 
neutral derivation also arises: What justifies any limitation upon 
legislatures in this area? What is the origin of any principle one may 
state?114 
In Wechsler’s wake,115 Bork framed the phenomenon as an issue over the 
“neutral definition of principle”116 but it is often scholarly referred to as 




112. See supra Part I.B. 
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
114. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7 
(1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]. 
115. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959) (arguing for a neutral application of the constitutional rules).  
116. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 114, at 2.  
117. Bork himself eventually yielded to this second choice of words, which has many other 
supporters. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Foreword to GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, at xi (1985) [hereinafter Bork, Foreword]; Mark V. 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Raoul Berger, An Anatomy of False Analysis: 
Original Intent, 1994 BYU. L. REV. 715 (1994). Some scholars had conversely opted for the 
expression “level of abstraction.” See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The 











The problem with this “sublimation of intention” is the legal puzzle it 
leads to: What is the point of enacting rules at a constitutional level (i.e., a 
level conceived not to be subject to the democratic majority rule) if they 
are subsequently meant to change over time through the same democratic 
appreciation118 the constitutional status should have preserved them from? 
If overcoming majoritarian democracy by withdrawing some rights from 
majority-rule deliberation is the rationale for a rigid Constitution, then 
Dworkin’s abstract clauses contradict this end. 
As Judge Frank Easterbrook has succinctly written, 
If the living legal community is indeed the right benchmark, it is 
tempting to ask: why a constitution? A written constitution . . . is 
designed to be an anchor in the past. It creates rules that bind until a 
supermajority of the living changes them. You can imagine change 
by the living in ways other than those described; after all, our 
Constitution was ratified without the unanimity required by the 
Articles of Confederation. That constitutional change requires a 
supermajority sustained over an extended period cannot be doubted, 
however—for to doubt it is to doubt the ability of the past ever to 
constrain the present, and thereby to destroy the source of the 
judges’ claim to countermand the will of contemporary majorities. 
Yet putting questions about the level of abstraction to today’s legal 
community dispenses with both the supermajority requirement and 
the need for some stability in that opinion (which must endure long 
enough to obtain a two-thirds vote in both chambers of Congress 
and a majority in three-fourths of the states’ legislatures, a process 
that takes considerable time).119 
The idea of the judicial modification of the clauses of the Constitution 
does not seem to comport with the rationale that underpins a rigid 
constitution. If the Framers of the United States Constitution wanted every 
subsequent generation to enforce its conception of a “cruel and unusual 
punishment”—and not merely adhere to those from the time of 
enactment—would it not have been a shorter and more economic route to 
leave the topic deregulated, and therefore apt to being addressed by the 
ordinary democratic process? Why establish a rigid Constitution—which 
mandates supermajority legislative consensus to amend certain 
 
 
(1981); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 
952 (1995). 
118. See supra Part II.A ¶ 4. 











provisions—if the implied goal was to apply those provisions in the way 
most people would conceive of them, in all future times? 
2. Three Auxiliary Hypotheses and Their Expensiveness 
The only way to address this controversial question—why a rigid 
Constitution if it was conceived to be amended through some judicial 
“moral reading”120 that ultimately replicates the ordinary majority rule—
entails resorting to some implicit intentions on the part of the Framers. An 
auxiliary hypothesis has to fill in for the apparent inconsistency, and three 
seem especially worthy of consideration. 
First, we may think the Framers nurtured the hope that future 
generations could subsume their different conceptions into the same legal 
text to engender an illusion of eternity, continuity, and stability for those 
clauses and the legal system they were going to underpin.121 As Brest 
notes, “[b]elief in the continuing authority of the Document may 
contribute to a sense of national unity and to law-abiding behavior by 
officials and citizens.”122  
In the case of abstract clauses, judges would take care of updating their 
meaning to fit new circumstances, but it is important that constitutional 
wording remains the same for continuity appearances: Even though, that 
is, the Framers would have never held those instances as legitimate 
applications of the clause. In this sense, the Constitution is materially 
eternal, but subject to different interpretations throughout history, 
similarly to what happens with religious “timeless” texts.123 The Framers 
implicitly endorsed this amending procedure—alternative to the one set 
forth in Article V and left to the judges to carry out—when they attached 
the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. In this sense, it is the Constitution 
itself that demands that “[j]ustices . . . be able to maintain an illusion of 
adherence to legal principle.”124 
The second hypothesis might go further and claim that the Framers 
sought to withdraw the valuation of concepts like “cruel and unusual 
punishment” to the democratic process itself by equipping judges with 
 
 
120. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 35, at 13. 
121. See Samuel L. Levine, The Constitution as Poetry, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 737 (2019) 
(making a compelling case for the resemblance of the Constitution and the Torah as timeless texts 
designed to be differently interpreted throughout history). 
122. Brest, supra note 49, at 234. 
123. See Levine, supra note 121, at 752–55. 












elastic tools for overriding democratically enacted decisions.125 Since they 
did not want to highlight this anti-democratic aspect of the Constitution, 
they concealed it within the peculiar language of these clauses. This is a 
more extreme version of the first hypothesis: Not only judges claim to 
apply the original law when what they are really doing is updating it to the 
current conceptions of the majority. Here, they are supplanting the will of 
the people with their own.  
This interpretation overlaps with the idea that the Bill of Rights does 
not amount to a historical set of rights and liberties granted to all the 
citizens of the United States, but rather to the empowerment of specific 
agents with the capacity of inoculating substantive policies by means of 
those clauses.126 Surely rigid constitutions are per se anti-democratic to the 
extent they withdraw some policy areas from majority rule democracy.127 
Nonetheless, a precise and historically circumscribed limitation of 
democracy (i.e., the structure of government, some specific rights, certain 
power-conferring rules, etc.) is different from the inexplicit establishment 
 
 
125. Much like the case of the “conspiracy theories” of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 122 (2d ed., 1997) (framing Bickel’s “open-ended” phraseology theory as a conspiracy 
theory); Howard J. Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 
371 (1938) (debating the Republican alleged plot to allow corporations and business to enter the notion 
of “person” in the Due Process Clause). 
126. This is, again, Dworkin’s idea that the abstract language the Framers employed points to 
the empowerment of judges to do the kind of adjudication Borkean originalists would regard as 
overreaching. This line of reasoning is not, for Dworkin, an interpolation of the Framers’ ideas but true 
adherence to their original intent: American citizens should apply the true idea of moral ideas such as 
“cruel,” even though the Framers, as it were, had gotten the law wrong—as in the case, e.g., of the 
Framers’ likely assent to school segregation. “The moral reading insists that they misunderstood the 
moral principle that they themselves enacted into law.” DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 35, at 
13. However, I think Dworkin would have hardly consented to this auxiliary hypotheses as I presented 
it: As is widely known, one of the main points in Dworkin’s scholarship was to contrast the idea that 
judges claim to do something—namely, apply the law—while what they are doing is something else—
that is, making up the law. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 6–11 (criticizing the plain-
fact view under which if lawyers and judges disagree over the law in some cases, they must be really 
arguing over what the law should be). Dworkin argues that the judicial update of constitutional clauses 
was overtly called upon by the abstract language the Framers employed, and we should, consequently, 
stop bewildering over this kind of judicial activism (“There is therefore a striking mismatch between 
the role the moral reading actually plays in American constitutional life and its reputation. It has 
inspired all the greatest constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court, and some of the worst. But . . . 
it is almost never openly endorsed even by judges whose arguments are incomprehensible on any other 
understanding of their responsibilities”). DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 35, at 3. Moreover, 
it is telling a fact that, aside from Dworkin, there has been little support for an “original understanding 
of judicial enforcement” among supporters of judicial activism. Indeed, arguments for judicial 
enforcement of the Bill of rights have generally rested in some better “natural” ability of the judges in 
enforcing fundamental rights. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of 
Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1536–50 (2000) (critically recalling several similar positions). 
127. That is the cause of the “countermajoritarian difficulty”: “The root difficulty is that 
judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 











of an authority capable of permanently overriding majority decisions in 
some areas of the law. Arguing that judges are better suited to rights 
enforcement means only begging the question of whether it was the 
amender’s historical purpose to entitle them to do so.128 It bears 
emphasizing, however, that this second hypothesis is at variance with my 
second adjustment of Dworkin’s theory: If the Framers aimed to empower 
judges with this anti-democratic ability, then it is impossible to hold that 
they were also expected to appreciate the majority’s opinion on abstract 
concepts such as a “cruel and unusual punishment[].”129 
As a third possibility,130 the Framers’ purpose for the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause was more limited: to deny lawmakers the 
possibility of enacting punishments the lawmakers themselves would have 
considered “cruel and unusual.”131 Times of particular social danger and 
distress might bring people to demand extremely harsh and exemplary 
punishments.132 People may urge legislatures to enact penalties the people 
themselves regard as cruel and unusual: Cruel and unusual crimes call for 
cruel and unusual punishments, the slogan might go.  
In this case, the Eighth Amendment would quash this very possibility. 
People and legislatures can use whatever punishments they want, insofar 
as they do not claim to be inflicting “cruel and unusual punishments.” The 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause dictates that crimes, no matter 
how heinous, not be answered with penalties the people and the 
legislatures themselves would consider to be “cruel and unusual.” What 
the abstract clause bans here is the familiar principle of “an eye for an 
eye.”133 
These three reconstructions share in the idea that the concepts of 
cruelty and usualness considered in adjudication can differ from the ones 
the Framers retained at the time of enactment. Moreover, the first one (i.e., 
the “pretense of continuity theory”134) and the third one (i.e., the “anti-
retributionist theory”135) comport with the idea of the “democratic 
 
 
128. For some critical stances toward the alleged benefits of the Bill of Rights’ judicial 
enforcement see Cross, supra note 126, at 1536–73. 
129. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
130. I thank Eugenio Vezzosi for signaling to me this possibility while discussing the topic.  
131. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
132. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 907, 969–70 (2011) (discussing how legislatures ratchet up 
criminal penalties during critical moments). 
133. See Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of 
Punishment, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STU. 57 (2008) (making a compelling case for conceiving of the 
retaliation principle as a historical improvement of criminal punishment).  
134. See supra Part II.B.2. 











appreciation” mentioned above.136 In fact, we can probably dismiss the 
second reading of the clause (i.e., the “conspiratorial theory”137) by simply 
shifting the burden of proof: The onus probandi of the concealed intention 
of “judicial supremacy”138 rest on their proponents. If judicial activism had 
no relevant backing at the Framers’ time,139 while the separation of power 
theme was held on the highest esteem,140 it is plausible that the burden of 
proof would rest on the supporters of judicial supremacy view, not on the 
traditional, linguistically-plainer one. The evidential question is difficult, 
for if the Framers had such an “unspeakable” intention (i.e., to empower 
judges with normative powers without making it manifest) they arguably 
omitted to acknowledge it in their writings or proceedings. Inferring from 
silence, that is, is always a hard task. 
However, two auxiliary hypotheses would emerge unimpaired by this 
simple argumentation.141 Therefore, we are still in want of something more 
to decide whether the Dworkinian foundation of the judicial update of 
abstract clauses, when supported by these auxiliary hypotheses, is 
ultimately sound.  
My refutational argument hinges on the linguistic difference between 
two kinds of rules that Hart has famously categorized for us when 
rejecting Austin’s imperative theory: the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules.142 Rules of the first type qualify individual behavior as 
prohibited, permitted or obligatory, and thus are traditionally identified 
with statutes that criminalize certain behaviors or oblige people to pay 
their taxes. Secondary rules, instead, comprise both rules that bestow on 
certain public subjects the authority to do something (e.g., the 
constitutional provision that dictates how the parliament can lawfully 
enact the said criminal statute, the precedent that empowers a court to void 
 
 
136. See supra Part II.A–B.1. 
137. See supra Part II.B.2. Here, the “conspiratorial idea” that the framer secretly wanted that 
the judges, not the people, to decide what is a “cruel and unusual punishment.” 
138. Cross, supra note 126, at 1530. 
139. Needless to say, by “judicial activism” I mean the natural phenomenon of judges 
overstepping their bounds and acting qua legislature. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The 
Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752 (2007) (recollecting the history of judicial 
activism in the United States); Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origins and Current Meanings of “Judicial 
Activism,” 91 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1445–50 (2004) (discussing the history and meaning of “judicial 
activism”). The point is that there is scarce evidence this approach could have been endorsed by the 
Framers: This is the central argument in Bork’s “original understanding of original intent.” BORK, 
TEMPTING, supra note 54, at 153–55. 
140. Cf. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 151–61, 176–87, 
(1969). 
141. Precisely, the “pretense of continuity” and the “anti-retributionist” theories. See supra 
Part II.B.2. 
142. See HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–99 (3d ed. 2012) (describing the 











the criminal statute if found in conflict with some constitutional rules, etc.) 
and rules that give private acts a particular legal relevance (e.g., the 
consensus of two individuals before an official, given certain conditions, 
may unite them in marriage). In Hart’s words: “Rules of the first type 
impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers, public or 
private.”143 
We can observe several instances of these two types of rules in 
constitutional law. For example, when the Constitution says that the 
Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,”144 it may certainly 
be controversial what “Commerce” means, but we might be pretty 
confident that we are facing a primary rule that grants a certain public 
entity (i.e., the Congress) the power to adopt binding decisions in that 
subject.145 Conversely, it might be disputable what “adhering to [the 
United States’] Enemies, giving them Aid or Comfort” may factually 
mean, but it is not an overreach to affirm that the Constitution forbids 
“Treason.”146 How can we be so sure about the different nature of the two 
clauses? For the very linguistic formulation generally helps us in 
distinguishing. In the case of Commerce Clause, we have an explicit 
conferment of power—“[t]he Congress shall have Power”147—while in the 
case of Treason we can infer the unlawfulness of Treason—a contrariis—
from the foreshadowing of trial as a consequence.148  
In this respect, Dworkinian abstract clauses present us with a curious 
puzzle. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, for example, is 
linguistically shaped as a primary rule: It seems to suggest that, if “open-
ended,” there exists a set of punishments that are “cruel and unusual,” and 
that set is forbidden. Nonetheless, in Dworkin’s interpretation, the clause 
behaves like a secondary rule insofar as it is understood as empowering 
judges, either to enforce their personal views or to appreciate the current 
 
 
143. Id. at 81. 
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
145. See, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 278–97 (2004) (discussing the original meaning of “commerce”). 
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
148. There is little doubt that the Treason Clause describes a criminal offense and thus a 
primary rule. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 193 (1982) 
(“[T]reason is the only crime to find definition in our basic document”). Treason is especially relevant 
to the history of American law. Id (“[T]he crime of treason is central to Anglo-American criminal 
law”). Despite scholarly obsolescence, the Clause has regained attention with the Bush 
Administration’s “war on terror” and the legal condition of terrorists. See, e.g., Carlton F. W. Larson, 
The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 












majority understandings of a “cruel and unusual punishment.” Thus, the 
essence of the Dworkinian Clause is that of a secondary rule, rather than a 
primary one. It is a secondary rule shaped in the language of a primary 
rule. If the same holds true with other abstract clauses, we can say that, for 
Dworkin, abstract clauses happen to be secondary rules disguised as 
primary rules.  
But if that is the case, we are admitting the existence of a third type of 
rules (this “secondary-qua-primary” rules). The move is “ontologically 
expensive” insofar as it introduces an additional category. If we have no 
external element in deciding whether to accept the provision as a 
“secondary–qua–primary” rule or to interpret it as a normal primary rule 
(i.e., a rule with a fixed, if “open-ended,” referential domain), we should 
stand for the latter possibility as it would make our legal world less 
populated. That is, if we assume that one quality of any scientific account 
is its “least ontological commitment,” Dworkin’s position winds up 
expensive as it admits of this third kind of rules, i.e., secondary rules 
worded as primary rules.149 
In this sense, the whole argument against Dworkin’s account and the 
auxiliary hypothesis can be construed as an inference to the best 
explanation.150 The rejection of his amending account can thus be 
advocated on the grounds that, ceteris paribus, it burdens legal ontology 
with an additional, unnecessary legal category. 
C. The Deficiency of the Sublimation and Some Quirks on Agency and 
Communication 
1. Arresting the Sublimation 
If Dworkin’s model seems ontologically expensive, one may question 
it, conversely, for playing out somewhat “deficient,” as it fails to provide 
the rationale for the sublimation’s arrest at a certain level of abstraction. 
As for the criterion that should stop the abstraction from historical 
 
 
149. See Willard V.O. Quine, On What There Is, 2 REV. METAPHYSICS 21, 33 (1948), 
reprinted in WILLARD V.O. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: 9 LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS 13–14 (Harper & Row 2d ed. 1963) (describing the ontological commitment of theories as 
“those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring 
in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true”). 
150. See Douven, supra note 77. According to Harman’s locus classicus, in the inference to 
the best explanation, “one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a ‘better’ 
explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given 












instances of the abstract clauses, the interpreter might feel left in the lurch 
by Dworkin. 
We might reconsider the Eighth Amendment and ask ourselves: “Why 
stop at the ban on behaviors that stand against the sense of cruelty and 
unusualness?” At a deeper psychological level, the Framers wanted to 
outlaw cruel and unusual punishments because they were “wrong.” If we 
are to fulfill this abstract level of intention, why should we not hold 
prohibited every behavior which might be considered “wrong,” either as 
against the sense of cruelty or against the sense of shame, or the sense of 
respect for others, or of reliability on one’s words, etc.? Why settle for the 
sub-cluster and not walk down the deeper level of agency—or “ascend” to 
the higher level of abstraction—at which the Framers acted in order to ban 
every behavior that would have been subsequently considered “wrong”?  
And what about the “positive side” of every prohibition, which is to 
promote, so to speak, justice or the common good? It seems possible to 
argue that at some deep level of agency there is no difference between, for 
example, a constitutional clause that forbids statutes curbing freedom of 
speech and a provision that forbids federal legislation compelling states to 
pay taxes for the national welfare. They both arise out of an intention of 
doing-what-is-right, from which we may derive new clauses only slightly 
related with the reference of the originally enacted one. And yet sharing 
the same volitive, causal urge. Why should one not think that the Framers 
meant future interpreters to call upon this abstractive regression? 
Scalia and Garner perfectly emphasize the point: 
The most destructive (and most alluring) feature of purposivism is 
its manipulability. Any provision of law or of private ordering can 
be said to have a number of purposes, which can be placed on a 
ladder of abstraction. A law against pickpocketing, for example, has 
as its narrowest purpose the prevention of theft from the person; and 
then, in ascending order of generality, the protection of private 
property; the preservation of a system of private ownership; the 
encouragement of productive activity by enabling producers to 
enjoy the fruits of their labor; and, finally, the furtherance of the 
common good. The purposivist, who derives the meaning of text 
from purpose and not purpose from the meaning of text, is free to 
climb up this ladder of purposes and to “fill in” or change the text 
according to the level of generality he has chosen.151 
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As Sai Prakash and Larry Alexander write, in an attempt to save 
intentionalist originalism from the doom of purposivism, “[t]he 
intentionalist does not advocate ascending up the ladder of generality of 
intention, at the pinnacle of which all laws turn out to be the Spike Lee 
law: do the right thing.”152 
Imagination might allow for even bolder interpretative flights than the 
“Spike Lee Law.” If “intentions are what matter,” we might further 
concede that the basic intention of every action is “bringing something 
about.”153 Would it be possible, then, to equate two different rules since 
they both were made out of an “urge to do something”? But then again, 
what would be the difference between the action of making up a rule and 
that of cooking pancakes? And how to justify the presence of multiple 
provisions concerning individual rights in the Constitution, if this 
abstractive reasoning were at our disposal? Why, given just one provision 
(e.g., freedom from “cruel and unusual punishments”) would it not be 
possible to climb up the intentional ladder to the “bringing something 
about” level and derive every other right therefrom (e.g., freedom of 
speech, commerce, etc.)? Would it equally be possible to infer rules that 
aim at bringing about wrongs (e.g., freedom of assassination) since proper 
behavior and wrongdoing both spring from a common “urge to do 
something”? 
Raoul Berger illustrated the gaseous state the sublimation of intention 
leads to with a brilliant quote from Barzun: 
“[A]bstractions,” wrote Jacques Barzun, “form a ladder which takes 
the climber into the clouds, where diagnostic differences 
disappear.” He adds that “at a high enough rung on the ladder of 
abstraction, disparate things become the same: a song and a 
spinning top are, after all, but two ways of setting air waves in 
motion.” Resorting to levels of generality is merely a device to 
escape from the bonds of the particulars.154 
 
 
152. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Is That English You’re Speaking? Why Intention 
Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 995 (2004). 
153. This is a standard definition for “action” in philosophy. See, e.g., Kirk Ludwig, 
Collective Intentional Behavior from the Standpoint of Semantics, 41 NOÛS 355, 374–75 (2007) 
(“When I brush my teeth, I am the agent of the brushing, but I am also an agent of it. It suffices for me 
to be an agent of it (whether intentionally or not) that, intuitively, my doing something contributed to 
bringing it about”). It bears emphasizing that “bringing something about” is here intended in the broad 
philosophical sense that encompasses “letting something happen.” See, e.g., John L. Mackie, 
Omnipotence, 1 SOPHIA 13, 22–23 (1962) (rejecting the distinction in the context of divine 
omnipotence). 
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Qua lawyers, we are acquainted with the poetic possibilities of language. 
A carbophobe’s attorney, for example, might contend that a State which 
allows for carbohydrates consumption in public inflicts on her client a 
“cruel and unusual punishment[].”155 Allegedly, the client might be 
suffering from psychological distress at the sight of the ingestion of pasta. 
The point is, judges and citizens hardly accept whatever reinterpretation 
defendants, or their lawyers, make of rules. 
We might go further in saying that democracy is exactly the tool we 
have invented for deciding the correct interpretation—or “conception,” as 
Rawls would call it156—of heavily debated concepts such as “justice” or 
“the common good.” If democracy settles political controversies through 
majority vote, constitutional interpretation solves the question of the 
meaning of the Constitution—whose rules people seem interested in living 
by in a constitutional democracy—through interpretative tools.157 What 
democracy decides by the means of elections and deliberations in 
Parliaments constitutional interpretation does, for example, through 
historical studies and, albeit controversially, fictional reconstruction (i.e., 




155. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
156. Rawls spelled out the concept-conception distinction in addressing alternative views on 
justice: “it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of 
justice and as being specified by the role which these different sets of principles, these different 
conceptions, have in common.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (rev. ed. 1999). However, 
Solum highlights the connection to Gallie’s work. Compare Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory 
Lexicon 028: Concepts and Conceptions, LEGAL THEORY BLOG, (Oct. 13, 2019) 
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with Gallie, supra note 107, at 176 (discussing different “conceptions” of “the ways [some] game is to 
be played”). 
157. Constitutional interpretation is here intended as the ascertainment of the meaning of a 
particular text (i.e., the United States Constitution): “I use the word ‘interpretation’ to describe the 
process of ascertaining the meaning of, and therefore the intentions behind, a communicative act. 
Thus, interpretation ‘just is’ the ascertainment of the original intentions of the communicator.” 
Lawson, supra note 21, at 1461. 
158. If there exists a “distinctively lawyerly” enterprise—i.e., an activity which is 
qualitatively proper of the sole lawyer—there is plenty of reason for arguing “hypothetical thinking” 
might be the one (“[R]ather than merely marshalling, channeling, and assembling the data provided by 
experts, the lawyer under reasonable-person originalism must also engage in an affirmative act of 
construction. There is a step in the process beyond explaining what the experts have found. And the 
lawyer is well positioned for that task. . . . Because, however, the Constitution is a legal document 
drafted in legal terms for legal purposes, a legal background is helpful, if not strictly indispensable, to 
understanding the Constitution. At the very least, a legal background is as or more important to the 
interpretative enterprise as is a background in history, psychology, moral theory, or any other 
specialized discipline”). Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 80. See also FRANK, supra note 12, at 











Whenever historical instances are removed, we are in dire straits as to 
the meaning of abstract clauses. We would expect Dworkin to provide us 
with a criterion for deciding their “true” referents, but insofar as Dworkin 
does not provide us with a rationale for the “boiling point” at which the 
abstraction should stop, lest it turn into the aforementioned “sublimation 
of intention,”159 there is some difficulty in breaking down the content of 
abstract clauses. One could find an argument for denying Dworkin’s 
reconstruction precisely in the understanding that the Framers did not want 
to enact any uninterpretable provision. After all, nemo tenetur ad 
impossibilia.160 
2. Agency and Communication 
At a philosophical level, Dworkin’s sublimation of intention seems to 
stem from a peculiar account of how actions and communications are 
supposed to work.  
In one respect, it is hard to square the activity of the Dworkinian framer 
with some commonsensical ideas about human agency. As generally 
conceived, an action is “intentional under some description,”161 a change 
of reality that points toward a result the agent is acting to reach. 
Negatively framed, it means that for an action to make sense, it has to be 
directed toward some results and not others. But in the case of the moral 
reading of the Eighth Amendment, what limits are there for the 
prescriptive content of the clause? Or, to put it slightly differently, what 
punishments are certainly not prohibited by the clause? Is there a device, 
other than personal taste and inclination, that should point to us the 
instances surely not covered by the clause? One may resort again to the 
idea of the illusions the Framers strived to implement (e.g., they were, that 
is, most interested in the pretense of an eternal linguistic formula, whose 
content judges and other interpreters would have restated at any future 
time).162 But if that is the case, how to make sense of several abstract 
provisions in the Constitution? Would it not suffice to state one single 
clause and let judges create other norms from one single “Spike Lee law”? 
The presence of a plurality of abstract clauses seems to be at odds at least 
with a complete overlapping in their meanings. 
 
 
159. See supra Part II.B.1.  
160. This is a variation of the more famous maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia.” HERBERT 
BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 242–43 (T. & J.W. Johnson 7th ed. 1874). Both 
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DIG. 50.17.185 (Celsus, Dig. 8).  
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Additionally, Dworkin’s account of abstract clauses seems also to clash 
with some common assumptions about human communication. This is 
evidenced, for example, in his fictional story of a company’s owner who 
has to fill a vacancy in one of her departments.163 For Dworkin, the 
situation of the abstract clauses’ interpreter resembles that of the company 
manager.164 
The owner requires the manager to fill the vacancy “with the best 
candidate available,” adding “without winkling or nudging”: “by the way, 
you should know that my son is a candidate for this position.”165 Dworkin 
asks the reader to assume a) that the owner is sincerely convinced of his 
son being the “best candidate,” b) that the owner presumes everyone 
would interpret the instructions as pointing to his son as the “best 
candidate,” and c) that the manager actually knows that the owner holds 
his son to be the best candidate.166 
“Hire the best candidate” could plausibly have three meanings: (a) 
“hire the candidate I, the owner, would deem the best,” (b) “hire the 
candidate you, the manager, would deem the best,” and (g) “hire the 
candidate which is in fact the best,” that is, “the best” according to some 
objective description thereof.167 Dworkin evokes a situation where the 
owner is possibly dissatisfied with the manager’s correct choice: 
You [the owner] told her [the manager] to hire the best candidate. 
And if, in her judgment, your son is not the best candidate, but 
someone else is, then she would be obeying your instructions by 
hiring that other candidate, and disobeying your instructions by 
hiring the candidate you intended and expected would get the job. 
You might—I hope you wouldn’t—fire her if she obeyed your 
instructions in that way. But you couldn't deny that she had been 
faithful to your instructions, and that she would not have been 
faithful had she deferred to your view about the best candidate 
instead of her own. An agent is unfaithful to an instruction unless 
she aims to do what the instruction, properly interpreted, directs.168 
On the surface, one may wonder why Dworkin feels the need to conjure 
up the firing. He has said the owner meant b (i.e., “whoever were to be the 
best candidate in the manager’s judgment, let he or she be hired” seems 
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here the correct instruction).169 If that were the case, the owner got what he 
asked for. Aside from trivial plot twists,170 what Dworkin might be 
insinuating here is that the owner was actually meaning a.171 But if so, it 
would be easy to object to the contradiction: Dworkin just told us that the 
instruction was b, and yet it was a.  
However, there is a simpler way to grapple with the example and it 
rests, again, on the implicit postulation of some objective notion of 
normative descriptions such as “the best candidate” (i.e., the owner’s 
instruction was g).172 In the case of the requisites for a job at a large 
corporation, the normative idea of “best” seems easier to fathom than, for 
example, the propriety of being “cruel and unusual” for criminal 
punishments. Although, paradoxically enough, Dworkin’s case of 
disagreement ultimately suggests the very opposite (i.e., that it is harder to 
pin down normative descriptions over some subject-matter than to discern 
someone’s historical intent). Still, we might wonder how comparable the 
requisites for a job are with the decision over the true notion of a “cruel 
and unusual punishment[].”173 
Perhaps the final lesson that can be gleaned from the excerpt is that 
Dworkin is hardly understandable without reference to some objective 
morality as self-evident as the requisites for performing a job. Although I 
debated Dworkin’s view as a rejection of “expectation originalism,” some 
passages hardly make sense absent the backdrop of objective morality—
for example, when he spoke of punishments that are cruel “according to 
the correct standards for deciding such matters.”174 
If that is the case, the conclusion would be that Dworkin finds his 
proper spot alongside metaphysical scholars of the law (i.e., scholars who 
postulate the existence of metaphysical moral objects) rather than strictly 
scientific researchers (namely, legal positivists). I am not sure whether this 
place might have agreed with Dworkin.175  
 
 
169. “Assume, moreover, that you wouldn’t have given the manager those instructions unless 
you were sure that it was obvious to everyone, including her, that your son was the best candidate.” Id. 
170. E.g., the owner fires the manager out of the disappointment of having been wrong about 
his son’s primacy in the eye of the manager. 
171. Again, we are ruling out other fanciful possibilities, e.g., a change in the owner’s mind 
during the selection process (i.e., b becomes a during the hiring phase). 
172. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1255–56. 
173. U.S CONST. amend. VIII. 
174. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1252. 
175. To my knowledge, Dworkin never repealed his anti-metaphysical original commitment. 
Speaking of his “characterization of individual rights,” Dworkin originally said that “it does not 
suppose that rights have some special metaphysical character, and the theory defended in these essays 
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D. The Price of Integrity 
If the critical apparatus of Dworkin’s conception of abstract clauses has 
been outlined, we can pursue some reflections about his interpretative 
theory.  
Were we to “make the best sense” of Dworkin’s account, as he himself 
would put it,176 we should bear in mind that Dworkin always had two 
specific concerns: the fairness and the completeness—or, as he famously 
called it, the “integrity” of the law.177 This second element might account 
for the interpretation he reached.  
For Dworkin, the point has always been to provide judges with 
guidance before every case, thus denying any sort of discretion in 
adjudication.178 In this respect, Dworkin’s model surely happens to be 
“more legal” than, for example, Scalia’s “faint-hearted” originalism.179 
After all, Dworkin still infers the referential revision of constitutional 
provisions from some (possibly misleading) constitutional intent, whereas 
Scalia candidly admits to refusing an originalist interpretation in some 
extreme occurrences180—which is a synonym, in Scalia’s legal thought, 
with being unwilling to apply the law.181 
However, the pragmatic benefits some constitutional doctrine might 
lead to, as well as the pretense of legality thereof, are not really the matter 
of contention here. Either from the point of view of a bullheaded political 
originalist or from the standpoint of the cognitive originalist, the only 
thing at stake is constitutional fidelity.182 The credibility of the 
psychological hypothesis underpinning some constitutional 
interpretation—here, the truth within the understanding that the judicial 
update of abstract clauses was originally set forth by the Framers—is what 
really matters. In this respect, if the outlined criticism seems tenable, it is 
hard to concede that Dworkin’s theory is a feasible reconstruction of the 
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Framers’ intentions. Even before engaging in a detailed historical inquiry, 
his account proves psychologically unsound. 
Dworkin’s model of the constitutional change of abstract clauses may 
thus yield a valuable adjudicative result,183 but “at too high a price,” as 
Hart would have it.184 In that it does not appear to comport with the 
rationale of a rigid constitution and with common-sense beliefs about 
language and communication, Dworkin’s view makes more sense when 
seen as a revision rather than an interpretation of the Constitution’s 
original meaning.185 
III. THE BORKEAN ORIGINALIST: ABSTRACT  CLAUSES AS CONCRETE 
CLAUSES  
A. The “Same Law New Law” Dilemma 
As unlikely as Dworkin’s account might appear, it proves practically 
viable: The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence clearly 
attests it.186 On the contrary, if a Borkean account of abstract clauses does 
comply with the rationale of a rigid constitution, it becomes ontologically 
unlikely. It has, that is, an insufficient descriptive value in regard with 
abstract clauses. This is the thesis I will advocate below. 
First, it ought to be noted that the U.S. Constitution does not contain 
any amending process outside Article V, nor did the Amenders in 1791 
provide any ad hoc procedure for the modification of abstract clauses.187 
Ergo, we must conclude that the Framers thought Article V’s provisions 
viable also with regards to abstract clauses (e.g., the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on “cruel and unusual punishments”). To the Framers, the abstract-
concrete clauses distinction was, if anything, not a matter of amendment 
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procedure. As to the Borkean amending standpoint, all clauses are 
concrete.188 
The problem with a “Borkean” account of abstract clauses lies within 
its result: It leads to a theoretically viable outcome that has, nonetheless, 
never taken place in reality. Following the Borkean approach brings the 
interpreter to a paradoxical expectation about how the amendment of 
abstract clauses should unfold. Some could even have a hard time calling 
this kind of legal change an “amendment” at all. I shall call this 
phenomenon the “same law, new law” dilemma. 
Let us consider a Borkean originalist interpreter, who conceives of 
every constitutional clause as a concrete one and therefore submits it to the 
procedures set out in Article V.189 With regard to the Eighth Amendment, 
for example, the originalist would hold the prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishments” to have a fixed “referential scope.”190 The provision 
refers to only some specific historical instances of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”191 The clause cannot be stretched to encompass cases of 
punishments that may be considered cruel and unusual today but were not 
regarded as such at the enactment’s time. The converse also follows: The 
clause outlaws punishments that were once considered cruel and unusual, 
even though they may not be perceived so today. In the Borkean 
originalist’s view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause refers to 
nothing but some specific examples at the time of the Amendment’s 
drafting.  
As time passes, what is socially considered cruel by the people changes 
and the need for an adjustment of the clause’s referential scope to current 
social perceptions may arise.192 New instances of cruelty emerge, while 
old paradigmatic cases are not considered proscribed punishments 
anymore.193 The clause’s reference needs to be updated.  
Let us imagine that the Government funds a trustworthy survey on the 
citizens’ current opinions on the death penalty. Assume that the survey 
clearly states that the killing of a person perpetrated by the State is 
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189. See supra Part I.B. ¶ 6. 
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regarded as a cruel punishment by the absolute majority of U.S. citizens. 
The Borkean originalist cannot hold the death penalty unconstitutional 
since many States retained it in 1791, and no signs of an abolitionist 
intention were given at the time.194 Nonetheless, she rebuffs the idea that 
the Framers requested her to perform any kind of Dworkinian “moral 
judgment.” Being loyal to the clause means holding unconstitutional what 
was regarded as a “cruel and unusual punishment” either by the Framers or 
by a “reasonable person” of that time.195 The legislature might ask the 
originalist how it is possible to adapt the Constitution to the current 
societal conception of a “cruel and unusual punishment.” The originalist 
would retort that an amendment pursuant to Article V has to take place. 
No way out.  
A shortcut solution would be to add the following words to the Eighth 
Amendment: “the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment” or “the 
death penalty is forbidden.” It seems indeed reasonable that such a 
momentous change would make its way into constitutional wording. 
Now, let us suppose that the survey had incidentally discovered that a 
lot of other changes have occurred where punishments were held cruel and 
unusual by the majority of the American citizens, when compared to the 
Eighth Amendment occurrences. The originalist could collect each of 
those variations and list them out in the new clause, thus determining what 
has to be considered cruel and unusual now. 
The problem is that the “itemizing approach” seems a toilsome and 
unnecessary  task. It is toilsome because many punishments once held 
humane and usual might now be perceived cruel and unusual; or, albeit 
less likely, instances of cruelty and unusualness might not be regarded that 
way anymore. Additionally, the notion of “punishment” itself can undergo 
relevant referential modifications.196 But most importantly, creating an 
“inventory of cruelties and unusualness” is not only a complicated task but 
a rather unnecessary one, as the phrase “nor cruel and unusual 
punishments [be] inflicted”197 would still perfectly generate the outcome 
 
 
194. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87–88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
195. Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 50, at 17. See also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, 
at 1. 
196. To some extent, every behavior that is enforced through public force can be subjectively 
perceived as punishment for something. Consider, for example, compulsory vaccination, which is 
traditionally not even considered a “punishment,” but that anti-vaxxers (a movement of people 
primarily in western countries who refuse vaccines for themselves and their families) might arguably 
contend to be a “cruel and unusual” one. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory 
Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 609 (2016) (arguing for the legitimacy 
of compulsory vaccination that does not instantiate a “punishment” for a particular religious group). 











the amending legislature aims to achieve. Words, as it were, are still 
functional to the intention. It is only a matter of time-reference. 
Let us assume our Borkean originalist is a word-thrift, one that does not 
change the words’ arrangement if it proves viable for the intention she 
wants to convey.198 She may ask herself: “Do I need, linguistically, to 
change the Formula?” The answer is surely negative: Linguistically, the 
words of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are still perfectly apt. 
The Borkean originalist needs only to change the time-reference.199 
Her final decision, then, would be to re-enact the words of the Eighth 
Amendment as they are now through Article V’s procedures. Paradoxical 
as it may sound, she would achieve her goal in doing so. The clause’s 
normative reference would shift to current times, while words remain the 
same: The provision displays the same string of words but with a t-value 
changed to today. On the grounds of the assumed consensus about the 
death penalty and other instances of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the 
re-enacted Eighth Amendment would address the people’s requests 
without employing any grammatical change. Same law, new law. 
This procedure is not only possible but mandatory for any non-
Dworkinian originalist. It is the only formal way to amend the abstract 
clauses of the Constitution for the “economic” Borkean originalist (i.e., the 
originalist who does not change the words of the clause if they are still fit 
for the prescription she wants to enact). The re-enactment of the same 
words of the original Eighth Amendment through Article V’s procedures 
ought to take place. 
I do not think one can disagree with this scenario from a theoretical 
(i.e., a priori) point of view: It might actually work out. It is a thinkable 
“state of affairs.”200 The problem with this re-enactment procedure is its 
“positive” status: this way of amending the Constitution has never taken 
place in the history of American law.201 Probably, it has never happened 
 
 
198 . There is a historical consensus against lengthy enumerations of rights in the 
constitutional text. While commenting on the incorporation of the Civil Rights Act in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Bickel stated:  
To all this should be added the fact that while the Joint Committee's rejection of the civil 
rights formula is quite manifest, there is implicit also in its choice of language a rejection—
presumably as inappropriate in a constitutional provision—of such a specific and exclusive 
enumeration of rights as  appeared in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act.  
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
61 (1955). 
199. The t value in the formal model. See supra Part I.B. 
200. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS, supra note 98, at 12. 
201. A related and more commonly debated phenomenon is the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause as differently enacted in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. See Ryan C. Williams, The One 
and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 498–500 (2010) (arguing that the 











throughout the entire history of law. No state, no legislature, no king—to 
my knowledge—has ever replaced a rule with a new rule displaying the 
same string of words and pretended to have changed anything in the law. 
In this sense, “same law” has arguably never been considered “new law.” 
We might even feel awkward in calling such a piece of legislation an 
“amendment,” even if aware of the time-reference shift. 
At the same time, it is hardly believable that the societal conception of 
a “cruel and unusual punishment” has not changed over time. Surely it is 
an empirical assessment, one that has to be evaluated through surveys and 
studies, but I would say it is a fairly agreeable one. In fact, it seems to be 
the only point the Supreme Court’s “Dworkinian” Evolving Standards 
doctrine and Scalia’s “Borkean interpretation” agree upon, since they are 
both premised on the very fact that a change in the societal conception of 
“cruel and unusual punishments” has taken place.202 They simply disagree 
on the inferences therefrom.203 
B. A Cramped View on Legal Concepts? 
Before offering my solution to the problem raised by abstract clauses, it 
is useful to confront a possible objection arising from the use of the 
concept of “referential content of a rule.”204 In fact, the “same law new 
law” dilemma (i.e., the need for re-enacting the same words in order to 
 
 
does not contain). The relevant difference between that instance and the “same law new law” problem 
is that there was a broader rationale for enacting the Fourteenth Amendment—namely, to extend the 
Due Process Clause to states and local governments. However, the re-enactment of the same formula 
wound up absorbing the substantive meaning of the Due Process Clause. By contrast, in the case of the 
“same law new law” dilemma, the re-enactment of the same provisions is necessitated by nothing but 
the referential change. 
202. Compare Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 179, at 861 (holding flogging and handbranding 
as punishments that are inconsistent with today’s current standards), with Dworkin, The Arduous 
Virtue, supra note 36, at 1253 (discussing the conceptions of Framers on what punishments were 
indeed cruel and unusual). 
203. If interpreted as postulating the existence of some “objective morality” similar to 
mathematics, Dworkin’s position is plainer and somehow more coherent. See DWORKIN, RELIGION 
WITHOUT GOD, supra note 96; Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue, supra note 36, at 1252 (“the correct 
standards for deciding such matters-cruel”). In this case, if there obtains a strife between today’s 
conception of “cruel and unusual punishments” and the Framers’ one, it “simply” means that either the 
current citizens or the Framers are mistaken in their concept of what a cruel and unusual punishment is 
(i.e., someone is doing the math wrong). Scalia’s interpretative account, nonetheless, might turn out 
metaphysically less-demanding, if one had a hard time accommodating the idea of some objective 
morality whose truth-value and computation should resemble those of mathematics. Besides, it was 
Scalia’s adjudicative account (i.e., the fact that he claimed he would have used his interpretative 
account in some occurrences) that stirred controversy, not his interpretation. See Scalia, Lesser Evil, 
supra note 179, at 864. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 291 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" 
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (criticizing Scalia’s account). 











update the referents of the expression205) might be mandatory only insofar 
as one is clinging to a limited view about how concepts and meanings 
work. 
In recent times, Gary Lawson and Tara Smith have raised the question 
of the troubled relationship between originalism and the philosophical 
nature of concepts.206 Despite reaching different conclusions, they both 
build upon Ayn Rand’s “objectivist” theory of concepts.207 Smith, in 
particular, reaches the worrisome conclusion that “Originalism fails to 
appreciate . . . that the language of the law, like all language (apart from 
proper names), is conceptual.”208  
What are originalists getting wrong about language and concepts? The 
main problem seems to be that at least some kind of originalism confuses 
the “referents” of the clause with the “criteria for determining the 
referents,”209 or, to put it slightly differently, it fails to grasp the “open-
ended nature of concepts.”210 The problem is most apparent in the case of 
technological development.211 If originalists believe that interpreting the 
Free Speech Clause means to grant protection only to the referents that 
were contemplated by the Framers, surely e-mails, for example, could not 
receive constitutional protection as they could not fit into the Framers’ or 
the public reader’s possible understanding of the clause in 1791. However, 
to interpret the clause in this sense would be a huge mistake, as the 
Framers arguably did not want to limit the clause’s meaning to what 
individuals believed at the time. Instead, what they identified are the 
“criteria for determining the referents”:212 that is, in the example, every 
possible means that conveys “free speech.” 
 
 
205. See supra Part III.A. 
206. Lawson, supra note 21, at 1469–70 (warning against the conflation of the “criteria for 
determining the referents” with the historical referents); Tara Smith, Originalism's Misplaced Fidelity: 
"Original" Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2009) (arguing that originalists fail to 
grasp the “objective meaning” of words). 
207. AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (Harry Binswanger & 
Leonard Peikoff eds., 2d ed. 1990). 
208. Smith, supra note 206, at 28. 
209. Lawson, supra note 21, at 1469.  
210. Smith, supra note 206, at 56. 
211. “[H]ow do we apply the fixed text of the Constitution, a document that is more than 200 
years old, to cases involving electricity, credit cards, the Internet, cell phones—scenarios that not only 
did not exist at the time the Constitution was ratified, but could not have been envisioned by the 
framers of the Constitution?” Levine, supra note 121, at 752. 
212. Gary Lawson weighs the concept of liberty under the Fifth Amendment instead of the 
Free Speech Clause (“An empirical reader would not ask for a laundry list of specific human activities 
that exhaust the content of the concept. But an empirical reader would ask what criteria the author, and 
derivatively the public reader, had in mind for distinguishing things that fall into that author’s/reader’s 
concept of ‘liberty’ from other things that are better organized—from the cognitive standpoint of the 











Besides the fact that hardly any originalist ever entertained such a 
view,213 this issue seems to have little bearing on the interpretation of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The Borkean originalist, in fact, 
does not read the clause as though it referred only to the particular 
subjective instances of a punishment that were “cruel and unusual” for the 
public reader at the time (i.e., new punishments might have hurt her sense 
of cruelty at the time and should thus be held unconstitutional). In this 
sense, she surely holds the “criteria for determining the reference” to be 
part of the original meaning: What is locked to the original meaning of the 
clause is the normative understanding of cruelty and usualness as 
conceived by the original interpreters. For the Borkean originalist, the 
Clause can qualify as constitutional or unconstitutional punishments that 
could never arose in the minds of the original interpreters. But the criteria 
that must be used in constitutional review are the original senses of cruelty 
and usualness—not today’s, as the Dworkinian originalist would 
conversely maintain.214  
If the similarly highly subjective concept of “beauty” were entailed, for 
example, the Borkean originalist could certainly apply it to facts the 
Framers never could have encountered, but the standard of “beauty” that 
will make up for the judgment of cruelty and usualness would be the 
Framers’, not her personal one.215 As Bork clearly stated in a different 
context, “[i]n a case like this, it is the task of the judge in this generation to 
discern how the Framers’ values, defined in the context of the world they 
knew, apply to the world we know. The world changes in which 
unchanging values find their application.”216 
In other words, the Dworkinian and the Borkean originalist are still 
performing two quite different operations when applying the Eighth 
Amendment, whatever theory of concepts one is to retain. The Borkean 
 
 
213. Originalists consistently argue for the extension of free speech guarantees to modern 
communication devices. See, e.g., Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 50, at 38 (arguing that “speech” 
and “press” work as a synecdoche for different types of communication); Nelson Lund, Living 
Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 31, 34 (2015) (claiming that the Free 
Speech Clause applies to the internet); Lawrence B. Solum, Construction and Constraint: Discussion 
of Living Originalism, 7 JRSLM REV. LEGAL. STUD. 17, 21 (2013) (arguing in favor the originalist 
protection of the internet in virtue of the “semantic content” of the freedom of speech); Steven G. 
Calabresi, On Originalism and Liberty, 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 29 (2015–2016) (resorting 
to Scalia’s image of the synecdoche). See generally Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the "Challenge of 
Change": Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently 
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927 (2009) (claiming that originalism 
has the interpretative tools for facing, among others, technological change).  
214. See supra Part II. 
215. The same holds, e.g., with the concept of “work of art.” Gallie, supra note 107, at 167–
68. 











originalist will confront some punishment with “the Framers’ values.”217 
The Dworkinian, conversely, is going to compare the punishment under 
evaluation with current societal perceptions.218 In this sense, their 
divergence is truly interpretative, not philosophical: The Borkean contends 
that the Framers meant to hitch the Clause to their standards of cruelty and 
unusualness; the Dworkinian holds that the Framers referred to every 
future generations’ understanding of the cruelty and unusualness of 
punishments. 
IV. A BREACH IN THE FORMAL CONSTITUTION 
If the aforementioned “same law” procedure is the only formal way a 
loyal, Borkean originalist can amend the Constitution, and if there had 
been changes in the societal idea of what a “cruel and unusual 
punishment” amounts to, how is it possible that the nobody has demanded 
that the clause be amended? Is it necessary to impute this outcome to the 
Supreme Court’s choice for some Dworkinian approach instead of a 
Borkean one? Or is there another possibility to conceive of this apparent 
strangeness? 
A. Partially Jettisoning Formalism 
Tertium datur: I stand for the third possibility. My answer to the 
dilemma is the simplest one: the best way to make sense of the amendment 
of abstract clauses is to conclude that it does not conform to formal legal 
reasoning. Instead, it is a plain instance of informal (i.e., non-legal) 
change. But if that is the case, the law is nonoriginalist (i.e., it does not 
comport with the original intent or public meaning)219 in this instance. 
As attempts to subsume this type of legal change under formal legal 
reasoning, both the Dworkinian and Borkean views fail. While the former 
appears psychologically unlikely, the latter turns out counterfactual and 
hardly believable, although theoretically viable. An originalist account 
such as the Borkean reconstruction, in particular, has insufficient 




218. See supra Part I.B. 
219. I do not dwell here on the distinction between the epistemic object that performs the 
interpretative work in different originalist theories. Despite the long-standing opposition between 
original intent and original meaning, modern scholars dispute the significance of the actual objects that 
“bind” the meaning of the clause. See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional 
Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2015) (arguing that cases of divergence between original intent 
and public meaning originalism are unlikely); Berman, supra note 29, at 9–10 (slighting the 











clauses legitimate—in that it does comport with the procedures of Article 
V—but at the same time it does not call for the “same law new law” 
amending procedure.  
The good news, however, lies in the fact that the destiny of legal 
inquiry is not necessarily bound to the one of formal legal change. On the 
contrary, I believe that we are better off when we cease trying to cram this 
occurrence into any formal account. Legal realism, as will be shown, can 
help us in making sense of the phenomenon of “informal legal change.”220 
Formalism is an important, and yet nonexclusive option when we deal 
with legal phenomena.221 It is generally a viable solution (even, as I tried 
to demonstrate, in the extreme case of abstract clauses!). Moreover, 
formalism is also frequently a reliable description of reality, as one can 
easily guess from the outstanding frequency of either compliance with the 
law, or punishment of trespassers. Even when legal rules are neither 
obeyed nor enforced, it is possible to explain the unpunished breaches in 
terms of the practical limits of the State’s repressive power. In sum, 
originalism and formalism are still arguably the go-to interpretations for 
legal phenomena.222 
But this might not always be the case, as the referential change of 
abstract clauses suggests. The limits of the Dworkinian and Borkean 
solutions thwart any attempt of encompassing this kind of legal change 
into a formalistic account. In this respect, it is possible to subscribe to 
Strauss’s remarks: “Although formalism has its advantages and 
functionalism its dangers, the former is simply incapable of describing the 
government we have.” 223 
We may wonder why this should be so. The answer is indeed obvious if 
we accept a simple idea of psychic equilibrium, under which every action 
has a tradeoff:224 sometimes the costs of some traditionally performed 
 
 
220. Of which “informal constitutional change” is obviously a subset. See supra note 10. 
221. See infra Part V.B. 
222 It bears noting that the validity of a formalist/originalist account for the broadest part of the 
law is actually consistent with the realist approach. Although the realists had often been regarded as 
unbridled rules-skeptics, they were frankly quite modest in their statements. They confined their 
skepticism toward rules to the range of cases that rose to the level of litigation, thus saving common-
sense formalism—and I would add originalism—as the true descriptive account in undisputed 
applications of the law (e.g., mere compliance with the law). See supra note 17. 
223. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions 
- A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 526 (1987) (emphasis added). 
224. I am implicitly thinking of Freud’s “scientific psychology.” See Sigmund Freud, Project 
for a Scientific Psychology, in THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 347–445 (Marie Bonaparte, Anna 
Freud & Ernst Kris eds., Eric Mosbacher & James Strachey trans., Basic Books 1954). See generally 
Lawrence Birken, Freud’s “Economic Hypothesis”: From Homo Oeconomicus to Homo Sexualis, 56 












action (i.e., formal/originalist application of the law) might outweigh its 
benefits. While playing by the rules—or punishing the transgressors, or 
ascribing the absence of punishment to the pragmatic limits of public 
force—is a choice whose social benefits generally outweigh enduring 
lengthy formal procedures, in the case of abstract clauses things might be 
the other way around. Here, formalism must strike as a (psychologically) 
costly solution, and compliance with entrenched rules is abandoned. This 
explains the lack of demands that a legislature re-enact a linguistically 
identical rule simply to update its referential content. In the case of the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, U.S. 
citizens short-circuit Article V’s procedure by consenting to judicial legal 
amending, in spite of its formal “illegality” (i.e., the property of lying 
outside of the original interpretation of the Constitution). The proof of this 
consent is to be found in the absence of any demand for a formal 
amendment of the clause, despite the modifications occurring within the 
notion of a “cruel and unusual punishment.”225 
Qua strict adherence to “paper rules,”226 formalism is a human value, 
and as every value it provides benefits at a price.227 Formalism enables 
human beings to rely on institutions and to conform their behavior  to rules 
by fostering legal certainty.228 Just as language does not operate in the 
idiosyncratic manner of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty if mutual 
 
 
225. However, inferring consent from tacit behavior remains controversial. See, e.g., KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 130–31 (1999) (criticizing theories of consensual government based on tacit consent 
of the governed). 
226. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
444–57 (1930). 
227. A refusal to acknowledge the natural value of formalism is what really undermines some 
reconstruction thereof. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 223, at 526 (“At best formalism serves as proxy 
for a functional approach for Justices perhaps unwilling to trust their inheritors—or even themselves—
with the difficult and contextual analyses that functionalism requires”). Formalism cannot be reduced 
to a “proxy” for future (untrustworthy) functionalist judges: It displays a daily value in legal relations, 
even before any adjudication is needed. See Schauer, supra note 41, at 510 (stating “[f]ormalism is the 
way in which rules achieve their ‘ruleness’ precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of 
formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise 
take into account. Moreover, it appears that this screening off takes place largely through the force of 
the language in which rules are written. Thus the tasks performed by rules are tasks for which the 
primary tool is the specific linguistic formulation of a rule. As a result, insofar as formalism is 
frequently condemned as excessive reliance on the language of a rule, it is the very idea of 
decisionmaking [sic] by rule that is being condemned….”). Are we really to deny the practical value of 
“decisionmaking by rule”? 
228. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the 
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 542–43 (1992) (outlining, although critically, the certainty 











communication is to bear fruit, a certain degree of formalism is necessary 
in order for the law to be a successful enterprise.229 
But formalism is not always the psychically economic choice, as we 
can infer from the legal change of abstract clauses.230 It has its drawbacks, 
its “psychological costs”—one possibly being the hindrance of the law’s 
prompt adaptation to societal changes. In the case of abstract clauses, legal 
formalism amounts to an unbearable blockade to legal change. Its purpose, 
its “raison d’être”231 becomes an unbearable burden. If the cost of formal 
compliance greatly outweighs the benefits—as in the “same law new law” 
fictitious example—citizens let go of formal strictures: They trade the 
certainty value provided by formal amendments with the smoothness, 
easiness, and day-by-day actualization of judicial update. To say it with 
Bork: In this case, “good results” trumps “legitimate process.”232  
The balancing of formalism and nonformalism can be conceived as a 
matter of psychic equilibrium: Every time the level of formalism is 
exceedingly severe, people dampen its effects by consenting to some kind 
of judicial activism.233 
While easy and agile, informal legal change arguably comes at some 
costs. Besides the potential loss in legal uniformity, empowering judges 
with the ability to reshape a clause’s content opens the way for judicial 
misuses (i.e., the manipulation of the clause’s content so that it does not 
match the citizens’ general ideas, but rather the personal tastes and moral 
convictions of the judges).234 Again, when legal uncertainty and judicial 
 
 
229. Humpty Dumpty is the hilarious character from Alice in Wonderland, who famously 
conceived of the meaning of words as the one the utterer would give to them. See LEWIS CARROLL, 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 185–97 (Peter Hunt ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2002). 
230. See supra Part III.A. 
231. That is, to arrange legal change into a fixed, verifiable procedure. 
232. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 54, at 261–65. 
233. The idea that formalism retains also desirable aspects secularly reflects Frank’s opposite 
considerations on the benefits of legal uncertainty: “Much of the uncertainty of law is not an 
unfortunate accident: it is of immense social value.” FRANK, supra note 12, at 7. 
234. According to Bork,  
Those who now dominate public discourse on these matters recognize that, if the Constitution 
is law, departures from the principles the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting are 
illegitimate. Yet such departures are essential if the results desired by the liberal culture are to 
be achieved through the courts. It follows that the Constitution cannot be law. Thus, the 
morality and politics of the intellectual or knowledge class, a class that extends well beyond 
the universities, can be made into constitutional law. . . .  
 
Judges are by definition members of the intellectual class and, in addition, for professional 
and personal reasons, tend to be influenced by the culture of the law schools. . . . If they can 
be persuaded to abandon the idea of original understanding, they are quite likely to frame the 
constitutional rules that reflect the assumptions of modern liberal culture.  











misuses raise to an unbearable pitch for a sufficient number of citizens, 
reverse phenomena are supposed to obtain, and a major dose of formalism 
is poured back into the legal system (e.g., through legislative introduction 
of stricter entrenched procedures, or academic literature that demands for 
higher compliance with the formal legal processes).235 Whit this re-
adjustment, the legal system goes back to balance. 
In a sense, political originalism can be seen as nothing but a 
physiological response to the pervasiveness of judicial activism. It is the 
law-organism’s reaction against biological dissolution. I would even go 
further in saying that, to a certain extent, an allegedly neutral research 
agenda is perhaps hardly neutral as it is pursued at a specific moment in 
legal history.236 
I think Justice Scalia’s candid openness to a nonoriginalist application 
of the Eighth Amendment comports with this acknowledgment of the 
limited value of legal formalism.237 In the case of the Eighth Amendment, 
an originalist analysis might dictate a certain result but that does not 
imply, per se, that it will be the chosen one: for formalism lies in 
competition with other values (most significantly, the desirability of 
 
 
235. This utilitarian conception of formalism is captured by Horwitz, although in excessively 
political terms:  
If a flexible, instrumental conception of law was necessary to promote the transformation of 
the post- revolutionary American legal system, it was no longer needed once the major 
beneficiaries of that transformation had obtained the bulk of their objectives. Indeed, once 
successful, those groups could only benefit if both the recent origins and the foundations in 
policy and group self-interest of all newly established legal doctrines could be disguised. 
There were, in short, major advantages in creating an  intellectual system which gave 
common law rules the appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable, and 
which, by making ‘legal reasoning seem like mathematics,’ conveyed ‘an air . . . of . . . 
inevitability’ about legal decisions.” 
Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251, 252 (1975) (first 
quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894) then 
quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960)). 
236. For what I mean by “political originalism,” see supra note 29. The remark goes 
somewhat against the claim of neutrality I affirm for the inquiry. I would rejoin, however, that there 
exists at least a meaningful sense in which producing scholarship with the intention of achieving 
political results is different from doing research for the sake of understanding phenomenon and 
forecasting future developments, despite any political relevance “neutral scholarship” could possibly 
assume. The difference rests in the (conscious) intentionality of the political effects. 
237. See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 179. It is easy, however, for living originalists to 
indict the view for cherry-picking (“[U]nder this approach, not all of the incorrect precedents receive 
equal deference. Judges will inevitably pick and choose which decisions they will retain and which 
they will discard based on pragmatic judgments about when reliance is real, substantial, justified or 
otherwise appropriate… This play in the joints allows expectations-based originalism to track 
particular political agendas and allows judges to impose their political ideology on the law—the very 











results).238 This is also why Lawson and Seidman describe what I called 
“political originalism” (i.e., the political claim that the Constitution be 
interpreted in an originalist fashion) as an issue for “political moralists”:239 
for cognitive originalism does not entail political originalism.240 This 
conclusion would incidentally agree with one of legal positivism’s main 
motifs: that “the certification of something as legally valid is not 
conclusive of the question of obedience.”241 This might be an interesting 
convergence for the grounding of originalism into positivism.242 
Albeit arguably a misinterpretation, this is also why I find Justice 
Warren’s use of the verb “must”243 in his famous formulation of the Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence illuminating: “The Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society.”244 The “must” could read not as an interpretative 
necessity245 (i.e., “the Framers wanted it to be read as if it entailed this 
evolving aspect”) but as a practical maxim.246  
It bears emphasizing that this devaluation of legal formalism is hardly a 
new or startling thought in the law. It is rather the reaffirmation of an old 
truth. From Antigone’s rebellion to the “decrees” 247 of the ruler on the 
grounds of the obedience to the “unwritten and unfailing statues of 
heaven,”248 to Aquinas’s maxim “an unjust law is not a law,”249 several 
 
 
238. “Good results,” as opposed to “legitimate process.” BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 54, at 
261–65. A famous example of “good results” that can hardly be squared with originalist adjudication 
is Brown v. Board of Education. See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board 
of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 457 (1995) (acknowledging the overwhelming 
consensus that originalism cannot support Brown). 
239. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 53. 
240. Id. 
241. HART, supra note 142, at 210. The reference to Hart raises, however, another question: 
Are the non-legal determinants that come into play where legal rules do not obtain to be included in 
the concept of “law”? This is exactly the type of conceptual theorizing that Leiter considers viable 
even in a post-Realists world. See LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 45. I 
would argue that there is little epistemic benefit in stretching the notion of law outside the “fairly crude 
type of legal positivism” the Realist seemed to retain. See id. But surely more argumentation would be 
needed here if my concurrence were not to boil down to a mere fiat. 
242. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
1455 (2019) (advocating originalism as the dominant interpretative practice in American law). 
243. Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
244. Id. (emphasis added). 
245. This would be the case if the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to be read as if 
entailing this “evolving capacity.” Contra supra Part II. 
246. The practical maxim consists of acknowledging that the original meaning could be 
different, but nonetheless claiming that we must (i.e., for practical reasons) interpret the clause as if it 
entailed the evolving mechanism even though we are giving up on original meaning in doing so. 
247. 3 SOPHOCLES: THE PLAYS AND FRAGMENTS 88–89 (Richard C. Jebb ed., trans. 1885). 
248. Id. at 88–91. 
249. This is the English translation of the traditional adage “lex iniusta non est lex.” See 











well-known individuals have claimed the existence of instances where the 
obedience to the law yields to the loyalty to other normative domains:250 
the law of the gods, the idea of justice, etc. But while these cases raised 
debate and controversy, the peculiarity of the abstract clauses’ case rests in 
its incontestability: Hardly anybody has ever demanded an application of 
the law similar to the one suggested by the “same law new law” 
experiment. No “crazy formalist,” as it were, has ever claimed that U.S. 
citizens abide by this awkward amending procedure. Whereas both in the 
case of Antigone and Aquinas the antagonist formalists’ claims seemed at 
least worth considering. 
It also bears mentioning that, in denying that the dyad 
originalism/formalism descriptively accounts for the legal change and 
application of abstract clauses, I am clearly assuming an “exclusivist” 
version of originalism, different, that is, from the one William Baude has 
recently proposed when raising the descriptive dilemma: “Is originalism 
our law?”251 The reason is that Baude’s “inclusive version of 
originalism”252—if considered as an “interpretation” of the 
Constitution253—seems affected by the very same issues that afflict 
Dworkin’s “moral reading,” as it allows for some “evolving construction 
of broad or vague language.”254 The only way, that is, to accommodate 
Baude’s “evolving construction” of abstract clauses within an originalist 
 
 
33 AM. J. JURIS. 99, 100–01 (1988) (discussing different versions and attributions). As Kretzmann 
notes, Aquinas’ quote of Augustine is actually different, as is Augustine’s original passage:  
“An unjust law is not a law,” quoted by British and American writers almost as often in Latin: 
“Lex iniusta non est lex.” I haven’t seen this non-est-lex slogan in Augustine or Aquinas in 
just those words, and I don’t know who coined it. But the tradition of the controversy makes 
it convenient to adopt non est lex as the standard expression of the dismissive judgment 
regarding a law. 
Id. at 101. 
250. See also Radbruch, supra note 49. 
251. Baude, supra note 5, at 2351 (evaluating originalism from the prospective of positive 
law). 
252. “[A] version that allows for some precedent, for some evolving construction of broad or 
vague language.” Id. at 2352. 
253. It may be debatable whether Baude’s notion of “originalism” is in fact an interpretation 
of the Constitution (i.e., an “ascertainment of meaning,”) rather than a normative proposal about 
adjudication (i.e., a practical proposal about what judges and other legal subjects should do with what 
the Constitution says). In fact, Baude’s originalism comprises (i.e., considers constitutionally 
legitimate) the referential developments of “evolving terms” (e.g., “the words ‘cruel and unusual’”), 
the “devices for resolving ambiguity or vagueness” (e.g., “construction” or “liquidation”) and the rule 
of stare decisis. Id. at 2356–61. The problem is, either these legal doctrines are legitimate because the 
Constitution says so—and that is a “true” interpretative problem—or Baude’s originalism is not an 
interpretation of the Constitution but rather a pragmatic approach toward its use. For the purpose of 
discussion, I am weighing Baude’s arguments as if they were entailed by the original meaning of the 
Constitution, and not some “ameliorated understanding” thereof. 











interpretation of the Constitution is to accede to a Dworkinian point of 
view and contend that the Framers actually called for the “evolving 
construction” to take place. If my exposition of Dworkin’s problems was 
sound, this possibility should be ruled out.255 
But if the Dworkinian interpretation is not viable, the only way to 
square originalism with “some evolving construction” of the Constitution 
is to lessen the epistemological constraints of the word “originalism,” so 
that it does not merely denote the meaning of the Constitution as intended 
by its authors—be they the Framers, the adopters, a reasonable reader at 
the time, etc.—but the revised meaning that results from interpreting some 
parts of the Constitution not as they were intended to be (e.g., in accord 
with the evolved meaning of the same words).256 
If that is the case, however, as Lawson elegantly puts it, “it is not clear 
that the label ‘originalist’ is doing a lot of useful epistemological work.”257 
Whenever “originalism” is used to propose something different from the 
original meaning of the Constitution, confusion arguably arises.258 Then 
either “old school” originalists ought to flee the notion of originalism—as 
Lawson seems to have done with his “empirical reading”259—or those who 
are interested in the something other than the “ascertainment of meaning” 
should use a different expression to describe their activity.  
B. Similarities in the Conflict of Laws 
Before moving to the jurisprudential aspect of these considerations, I 
want to explain one final story to depict my idea of the functioning of 
abstract clauses by matching it with an already studied legal phenomenon. 
 The fiction centers, again, on the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, and draws on the distinctive modes of incorporation 
in the conflict of laws, by exhuming a distinction which is generally 
known only within the Italian scholarship.  
Imagine that the Adopters of the Eighth Amendment, while 
transplanting the 1689 Bill of Right’s formula into the U.S. Constitution, 
had asked themselves: What do we even mean by “cruel and unusual 
 
 
255. See supra Part II. 
256. Baude, supra note 5, at 2352. 
257. Lawson, supra note 21, at 1458. 
258. See also James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1785, 1787–88 (2013) (“If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say that we evidently 
are all originalists now . . . . But if we define originalism so inclusively . . . it may not be very useful to 
say that we are all originalists now. We may obscure our differences more than elucidate common 
ground. For we would persist in most of our theoretical disagreements—it is just that we would say 












punishments?” Instead of debating the concept, they entrust a specific 
Council (let us call it the “Linnaeus Council”260) with the duty of defining 
a vast number of punishments to be held cruel and unusual. It bears 
emphasizing that the list is not intended to be all-inclusive, it is merely a 
“gallery” of commonly viable or otherwise “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”  
The Linnaeus Council draws up the long list of viable and forbidden 
penalties and sends it back to the constitutional legislature. The Amenders 
explicitly sanction the list by adding to the Eighth Amendment the ensuing 
words: “[nor cruel and unusual punishments be inflected], as defined in 
the list adopted by the Linnaeus Council.” The Amenders are explicitly 
referring to the list the Linnaeus Council published in 1791. 
After a long period of time, harsh criticisms are addressed to the 
Council, demanding it update the list for the purpose of making it more 
decent and humane. Some old punishments should now be considered 
cruel and unusual, protestors claim. Though more unlikely, the opposite 
might apply too, so that people demand the introduction of punishments 
once held cruel and unusual.261 Pressed by violent social unrest, the 
Council yields to the requests and amends the list. Citizens cheer at the 
news, as courts begin enforcing the updated list. 
The problem is, the original Adopters never intended to empower the 
Council with any amending capacity. They simply commissioned one list 
and proclaimed it to be law. Instead, the people and the Council 
interpreted the constitutional reference as to “whatever list were to be 
adopted by the Linnaeus Council.” By deploying the Italian conflict of 
laws terminology, a “rinvio materiale” (material renvoi) is misconstrued as 
a “rinvio formale” (formal renvoi).262 Instead of pointing at a foreign legal 
 
 
260. The fictional name is inspired by the great Swedish taxonomist Carl Linnaeus (1707–
1778). See generally Isabelle Charmantier, Carl Linnaeus and the Visual Representation of Nature, 41 
HIST. STUD. NAT. SCI. 365 (2011). 
261. In Italy, e.g., the death penalty was outlawed by the 1889 Criminal Code, but it was 
subsequently re-introduced under Fascism. See PAUL GARNFINKEL, CRIMINAL LAW IN LIBERAL AND 
FASCIST ITALY 417 (2016). 
262. Roughly speaking, we have a material renvoi when the domestic law regulates some 
internal case by applying some specific law of another legal system (e.g., a foreign statute), thus 
incorporating it as internal law (as though, i.e., the statute were carbon copied and enacted into 
domestic law). We have instead a formal renvoi when the domestic law refers to some specific source 
of the law in external legal systems. It bears emphasizing that the prima facie object of reference might 
be the same (e.g., a particular foreign statute), the difference being that in the case of the material 
renvoi any alterations in the referred legal document by its original (foreign) adopter (e.g., a foreign 
legislature) would not result in any change to its application in the domestic law that made reference to 
it. Conversely, in the case of a formal renvoi the object of the reference is not limited to the referred 
law (i.e., the statute per se) but also covers every possible amendment thereof: It is, precisely, a renvoi 











document and enforcing it—as if it were carbon copied and enacted qua 
internal law—the material renvoi legitimizes the document’s author as 
legal source (i.e., here, the Linnaeus Council). The renvoi’s reference 
shifts from one specific text created in another normative system to the 
authority that made it up, so that every authority’s subsequent change has 
to be given efficacy.263 A typical example of material renvoi can be seen in 
the functioning of the Assimilative Crimes Act in the U.S. Code.264 
Mutatis mutandis, a similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of 
the historical Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Here, of course, 
there is no Linnaeus Council nor any tangible list of forbidden 
punishments. The set of prohibited punishments is made up, instead, of all 
 
 
The distinction has some momentum. Italian scholars, e.g., have questioned the nature of the 
statute regulating the conflict of laws. See Legge 31 maggio 1995, n.218, G.U. Jun. 3, 1995, n.128 
(It.). If it were to be construed as a material renvoi, every subsequent amendment of foreign sources of 
law would have no impact as to its application in the Italian legal system, as the reference would 
remain the foreign law at the time of the Italian statute (i.e., May 1995). On the opposite, it if were 
construed—as it is—as a formal renvoi, every modification to the foreign sources in their original 
system would also modify the object of reference for application of the foreign law in the domestic 
system. The problem can be glimpsed in the enforcement of the decisions of the Roman Rota 
regarding Catholic marriages. See, e.g., ROBERTO GIOVAGNOLI, SEPARAZIONE E DIVORZIO 380–81 
(2009) (discussing the issue and the Supreme Court of Cassation’s decision to qualify the renvoi as a 
formal one). 
Distinctions of the ways foreign law become legally relevant in the domestic legal system are 
generally unknown outside the Italian legal scholarship and have been criticized as “sterile,” although 
they had some momentum for Kelsen: “[m]ost writers in other countries regard these doctrines as 
sterile, and even in Italy opposition to them is increasing. Nevertheless, they were taken up by Hans 
Kelsen in order to explain the application of foreign law within the framework of his theory according 
to which the law of each state is a closed system derived from a Grundnorm.” Gerhard Kegel, 
Fundamental Approaches, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 3, § 12, at 
11–12 (Kurt Lipstein ed.,1986). 
263. I am assuming that the Linnaeus Council is an external source of law with regard to the 
U.S. legal system. If we are to avoid the question of whether a private institution’s rules are internal or 
external to domestic public law, we might simply headquarter the Linnaeus Council in Uppsala, 
Sweden. 
264. 18 U.S.C. § 13. I thank Gary Lawson for directing me to this remarkable case. First 
enacted in 1825, the Assimilative Crimes Act was periodically re-enacted by the Congress in order to 
extend the states’ criminal law to the areas of exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction (“federal 
enclaves”) in case of crimes that were addressed by federal law. In 1948, the Congress decided to 
make the incorporation permanent by stating that “[w]hoever within or upon any [place of exclusive or 
concurrent federal jurisdiction] is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable 
by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of 
the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force 
at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.” 
Id. Therefore, whoever violates criminal law in, e.g., a federal building, is held accountable for 
violating the federal criminal law that results from the incorporation of municipal criminal law, absent 
an autonomous federal provision. The Assimilative Crimes Act has been unsuccessfully challenged on 
nondelegation grounds. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 297 (1958) (holding that “[t]he 
application of the Assimilative Crimes Act to subsequently adopted state legislation, under the 












the “cruel and unusual punishments” as possibly understood by 18th-
century U.S. citizens. In both cases, however, the Framers meant to 
prohibit a fixed set of “cruel and unusual punishments”: They enforced the 
material renvoi to a precise domain of “cruel and unusual punishments.” 
(The alternative entails maintaining that the Framers originally wanted to 
enact a formal renvoi, but that cannot be the case if we are correct in 
considering the Dworkinian interpretation inconsistent with the rationale 
of a rigid constitution, among other things). For practical reasons, 
nonetheless, in both cases the material renvoi has been historically 
construed as formal renvoi. Judges, that is, have been expected to enforce 
an updated version of the list. (In the fictional case there has been an 
aggressive demand for that, whereas in the current world the expectation 
has simply taken place “implicitly.”) Wherefrom do we infer that the 
renvoi has been tacitly misconstrued? We deduce it from the very fact that 
the “same law new law” procedure has never taken place, nor anyone has 
ever demanded it.  
In this perspective, it is hard to disagree with James Beck’s remark that 
the Supreme Court acts as a “continuing constitutional convention.”265 It 
might be a divisive conclusion, however, whether the Court is factually 
performing the mentioned “democratic appreciation”266 of majority values, 
or the antidemocratic enforcement of some intellectual minority’s political 
views.267 
V. EMBRACING LEGAL REALISM 
The final question to be addressed is the practical one. If the 
amendment of abstract clauses does not undergo formal legal procedures, 
then a formalist approach to adjudication cannot account for the 
phenomenology of the law in this respect. And if it is the lawyer’s task to 
master whatever happenings in the realm of law, traditional legal 
reasoning is not going be enough here.268 
If Dworkin’s model’s rejection and the “same law new law” dilemma 
are sound, a cornerstone tenet of American Legal Realism is confirmed: 
 
 
265. BERGER, supra note 125, at 3–4 (quoting JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1922)). 
266. See supra Part II.A–B. 
267. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Interpreting the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1019, 1049 (1992) (contending that “policymaking by judges...provides a means by which 
persons whose views were rejected in the political process may nonetheless prevail”). 
268. There is hardly a clearer example of traditional legal reasoning than the one expounded 











legal indeterminacy.269 As Brian Leiter writes, “[legal indeterminacy] is 
the thesis that the Class together with relevant Background Conditions is 
not causally sufficient to determine only one outcome.”270 By “the Class,” 
Leiter means the set of “legitimate legal reasons”271 coupled with two 
“Background conditions”:272 “(1) judges are rational, honest, competent, 
and error-free; and (2) the law exercises its causal influence through 
reasons.”273 Insofar as neither the Dworkinian nor the Borkean model 
explain for constitutional legal change in the case of abstract clauses, the 
Realists’ tenet is true: In the case of abstract clauses, legal rules do not 
explain the behavior of judges. 
How, then, should the lawyer relate to the legal change of abstract 
clauses, if she is to master them in court? I would imagine at least two 
possible lines of inquiry.  
A. Abstract Clauses as Indexicals 
On the one hand, it might be possible to regard the phenomenon as a 
linguistical conundrum. One can even recast the entire opposition between 
Bork’s and Dworkin’s originalism as a disagreement over the indexical 
use of notions like “cruel” and “unusual.”274 
Indexicals are words like “I,” “my,” “that,” “this,” “now,” “tomorrow,” 
“actual,” “present,” whose reference seems to be singularly dependent on 
the context of utterance.275 As David Kaplan famously wrote, with 
indexicals “the referent is dependent on the context of use and . . . the 
 
 
269. Compare Leiter, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 10–11 (distinguishing 
between rational, causal, global and local indeterminacy), and Lawrence B. Solum, On the 
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987) (making a 
compelling case for local indeterminacy), with Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (arguing in favor of a 
broad account of legal indeterminacy in the “interesting” part of the law). 
270. LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 9.  
271. For Leiter, the Class is composed of “the legitimate sources of law,” “the legitimate 
methods of interpreting sources of law,” “the legitimate ways of characterizing the facts of a case in 
terms of their legal significance” and “the legitimate ways of reasoning with legal rules and legally 
described facts.” Id. at 45. 
272. LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 9. 
273. Id. 
274. For another case where indexicals seem relevant to constitutional interpretation see 
Christopher Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals As A Basis For Textualist Semi-
Originalism, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1641–67 (2009) (weighing the indexicality of Article 
VI). 
275. The examples are taken directly from David Kaplan, Demonstratives: An Essay on the 
Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals, in THEMES 











meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent in 
terms of certain aspects of the concept.”276 In the words of David Braun, 
[a]n indexical is, roughly speaking, a linguistic expression whose 
reference can shift from context to context. . . .  Many philosophers 
hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first sort of 
meaning is often called ‘linguistic meaning’ or ‘character’ . . . . The 
second sort of meaning is often called ‘content’. Using this 
terminology, we can say that every indexical has a single unvarying 
character, but may vary in content from context to context.277 
The reference of an indexical is context-sensitive in a way that other words 
are not. We all employ the word “I,” even though the reference differs 
from person to person. Similarly, the context-sensitivity within terms like 
“cruel,” “unusual,” “punishments,” appears different in character—and in 
reference’s complexity—than in words like “thirty,” “years,” or “age.” 
It seems the very kind of problem we face in grappling with the Cruel 
and Unusual Clause. The definite description “cruel and unusual 
punishments” has only one meaning (what Kaplan calls “character”278) but 
refers to different objects in “different contexts.”279 This is, roughly 
speaking, why the expression “cruel and unusual punishments” denotes 
different instances today than what it did in 1791. Although the meaning is 
the same in both contexts, once the expression has been cast by a specific 
agent in a specific time its reference has been attached to the sense of 
cruelty and usualness of some particular individuals (i.e., the Framers or 
the speaker at the time). 
We can now translate the debate over which punishments are “cruel 
and unusual”280 in indexical terms. On the one hand, the expression can be 
commonsensically regarded as a linguistic indexical, insofar as the same 
words can be uttered at different moments in time and space and refer to 
 
 
276. Id. at 490. 
277. David Braun, Indexicals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Jan. 16, 2015) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/indexicals/ [https://perma.cc/7WCL–85MM]. 
278. Kaplan, supra note 275, at 505–07. 
279. I may be oversimplifying Kaplan’s theory as long as I do not account for his “possible 
world semantics.” Id. at 494. However, I think it is hardly a necessary complexity. Qua historical 
interpreters, we are exclusively concerned with the actual historical world in different times (i.e., today 
and 1791). What Kaplan warns us not to forget when recalling the “possible worlds semantics” is that 
indexicals are functionalized both at contexts and possible worlds. In our case, for instance, not only 
does the expression “cruel and unusual punishments” denote different objects for different agents at 
different times (“contexts”), but it could designate different objects for the same agents at the same 
time in two different possible worlds—the truth-value, i.e., of the indexical expressions depends also 
on the “circumstances of evaluation.” Id. This is what goes under the name of “double-indexing.” 
Braun, supra note 275, at 9. 











quite different objects. Linguistic indexicals are theoretically suitable to a 
plurality of referents, but once they are uttered by a specific speaker in a 
specific moment their reference crystallizes in the historical utterance. 
This is the sense of indexicals that Bork and classic originalism should 
presumably agree on. We might name these proper indexicals, as no 
alternative account of indexicals is properly given in philosophy of 
language.281 
On the other hand, a Dworkinian account of this type of clauses would 
go one step further.282 The expression “cruel and unusual punishment” is 
not only a “proper indexical” (i.e., terms that can be uttered by several 
agents and thereby refer to very different objects) but it was meant by the 
Framers to be indexically used. We could speak here of “normative 
indexicals.” Qua normative indexicals, words such as “cruel” and 
“unusual” are meant to be re-uttered by future interpreters and hence 
referred to their current times. Words are not linked to the standards of 
cruelty and usualness at the time of the Eighth Amendment’s Framers: 
They refer to the different standards of every future interpreter. 
For the same reasons I do not find Dworkin’s account persuasive, I 
would shrink from interpreting abstract clauses as “normative indexicals,” 
even though the possibility cannot be logically disposed of. It proves, 
however, psychologically inconsistent with the rationale of a rigid 
constitution.283 
At the same time, to regard abstract clauses as “natural indexicals” 
provides little help in understanding their modification (i.e., in discovering 
how they get factually amended and what meanings could judges or juries 
attach to them in court). What is the lawyer to do with the bare 
acknowledgment that she is facing this particular instance of natural 
language? How would this renewed awareness about its semantic 
character help her in providing legal expertise? How would it enhance her 
performance in court? It appears as though the “linguistic turn” in legal 
scholarship does not agree with the practical purposes that mostly concern 
the lawyer.284  
The alternative approach, conversely, requires widening the scope of 
legal inquiry to non-legal determinants of behavior. 
 
 
281. Braun, supra note 273, § 1.3. 
282. See supra Part I.B–II.A (describing Dworkin’s account). 
283. See supra Part II.B.1. 











B. The Lawyerly Business 
Informal, “nonoriginalist” amending does not translate in haphazard 
amending. If we accept a commonsensical deterministic hypothesis about 
the world, legal rules’ causal inefficacy implies that there will be other 
rules (i.e., non-legal rules, such as moral, psychological, social, economic 
ones) that determine and causally constrain the legal change of abstract 
clauses.285 Legal indeterminacy does not equal general indeterminacy.286 If 
the amending behavior that presumably takes place in the case of abstract 
clauses is not legal (i.e., it cannot be explained through legal reasons), then 
the behavior must be normatively controlled by other determinants (i.e., 
“non-legal reasons”).287 In other words, there is no need to give up on the 
idea of behavior as acting according to a rule: The acknowledgment of 
non-legal rules of behavior (i.e., the aforementioned “alternative 
normative domains”) fills the causal gap.288 
If we credit the hypothesis, the ongoing validity of another fundamental 
tenet of American legal realism—or at least, as Leiter calls it, of its 
“Sociological Wing”289 —is being reclaimed: that in order to grasp the 
functioning of some phenomena in the law (here, the amendment of 
abstract clauses) the lawyer cannot but draw on social sciences like 
sociology, anthropology, and psychology that aim at explaining the non-
legal determinants of human behavior.290 
As Leiter points out,  
if the Sociological Wing of Realism—Llewellyn, Moore, Oliphant, 
Cohen, Radin, among others—is correct, then judicial decisions are 
causally determined (by the relevant psycho-social facts about 
judges), and at the same time judicial decisions fall into predictable 
patterns because these psycho-social facts about judges (e.g., their 
professionalization experiences, their backgrounds) are not 
idiosyncratic, but characteristic of significant portions of the 
judiciary. Rather than rendering judicial decision a mystery, the 
 
 
285. “[E]ven if legal reasons underdetermine the decision, there still may be non-legal reasons 
(e.g. reasons of morality or policy) that do justify a unique decision . . . .” LEITER, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 40. 
286. Id. at 10–11. 
287. Id. at 24. 
288. Id. at 40 
289. Id. at 15, 28–29. 
290. “[T]he idea is that judges instantiate general characteristics, rather than idiosyncratic 
ones. What these general characteristics are may be illuminated by sociology, or social psychology, or 











Realists’ Core Claim, to the extent it is true, shows how and why 
lawyers can predict what courts do.291 
Legal indeterminacy solely implies that a formalistic approach cannot 
account for the whole functioning of legal phenomena.292 The lawyer, 
therefore, needs to borrow cognitive tools and instruments from other 
social sciences to achieve a comprehensive account of the law.293 As 
Leiter again writes, “the thesis at issue here [in American Legal Realism] 
is that . . . when legal reasons do not justify only one outcome, then other 
psychological and sociological factors (e.g., the personality or the political 
ideology of the judge) must come into play to causally determine the 
decision.”294  
But why should the jurist be concerned with these psychological and 
sociological factors? Could she not leave it to the psychologist or the 
sociologist to deal with? It all boils down to the notion of “lawyer” or 
“legal scholar” one retains. I would think of a “lawyer” as the individual 
who knows the law better than the average citizen (i.e., more broadly or 
more thoroughly) and that offers her expertise as a commercial good.295 If 
knowing the law means being able to explain its happenings in a causal 
fashion and being able to predict its developments, then only stretching 
legal inquiry beyond formal rules might give the lawyer proper tools to 
achieve what she is striving for (i.e., causal explanations of legal 
phenomena and predictions of what courts will to).  




292. I subscribe here to the realists’ thesis of “Local Rational Indeterminacy,” as Leiter calls 
it, to juxtapose it with the C.L.S. writers’ “Global Rational Indeterminacy.” See id. at 11–12. “Local 
Rational Indeterminacy” suggests that the application of the law is indeterminate—i.e., not determinate 
by legal reasons—only in certain instances: For the realists, those are the cases that are actually 
litigated. Global Indeterminists, conversely, maintain the law to be always indeterminate. See id. at 
19–20. 
293. “The social sciences then—conceived “positivistically” (that is, on the model of the 
natural sciences)—were the tool for performing this crucial task. By approaching law like a behaviorist 
psychologist, an anthropologist, or an empirical sociologist, the Realists hoped to discover the real 
patterns of judicial decision-making, thus providing information of practical value to lawyers.” Id. at 
90. 
294. Id. at 10. 
295. It bears noting that I am merely holding to the Legal Realism’s traditional account of the 
lawyerly business as the one dealing in “actual specific past decisions, and guesses as to actual specific 
future decisions.” FRANK, supra note 12, at 51. 
296. “[H]ow one becomes what one is.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ECCE HOMO: HOW ONE 













This Article illustrates the difficulty of describing the legal change of 
the U.S. Constitution’s abstract clauses in originalist terms and, in doing 
so, stresses the ongoing necessity for the kind of legal inquiry American 
legal realism has historically advocated. In that both the Dworkinian and 
Borkean originalist accounts prove unable to satisfactorily explain the 
legal change of abstract clauses, constitutional law is nonoriginalist at least 
regarding this area of the law. The conclusion, however, is not a blanket 
refutation of formalism and originalism. More modestly, it means 
acknowledging that the human value that often renders originalism a good 
descriptive account of legal phenomena—namely, the certainty value 
within the formalism it encapsulates—is in competition with others—
namely, the desirability of the outcomes. Whenever the latter prevails on 
the former, originalism and formalism turn out descriptively unsound. 
But if it is the lawyer’s job to “know her way around” in those areas of 
the law that do not respond to formal legal reasoning, only disciplines 
concerned with other domains of normativity (psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, economics, etc.) are going to help her in carrying out her 
duty. Conversely, it is hard to expect any help from analytic philosophy, 
although abstract clauses resemble strikingly the function of the linguistic 
expressions analytic philosophy dubs “indexicals.”  
However, both the indeterminacy of the law and the necessity to 
address it through different social sciences were already clear fundamental 
tenets in the American legal realism. Hopefully, the Article should 
reaffirm the ongoing relevance of the realists’ insights for constitutional 
law. 
